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THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AS A STRATEGIC PROBLEM

by



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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Transformation of German-American Relations As A Strategic Problem submitted by James Frederick Sattler in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT

Since the Second World War, Western nations have attempted to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe. However, Western strategic doctrine and international security organization have channelled the power of Western nation-states in such a way that the strategic contest between East and West in Europe has become asymmetrical. This has resulted in nothing less than a crisis of governance in the West. Since the Soviet Union continues to develop its potential for offensive bilateral diplomacy, Western containment strategy should devote more attention to improving bilateral relations as they exist, instead of conducting diplomacy which seeks to transcend bilateral relations and create superstates and supranational organizations.

In Europe, the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany is theoretically of great strategic significance. But it is becoming increasingly impotent because the actual bilateral problems of the two states are neglected in favor of preserving the myth of an Atlantic Community which obfuscates the nation-state relationship. The Atlantic orientation of both the United States and West Germany has thus come to signify the actual disorientation of their power as nation-states. Activity which could strengthen the relationship as it exists is held in suspense while both sides wait for a higher order of international relations to emerge. The strategic operations of each - Ostpolitik and troop

stationing - have become counter-productive and are illustrative of their mutual entanglement in "higher" NATO strategy.

The maintenance of an effective system of Western governance requires that both the United States and West Germany achieve a re-orientation of their foreign policies. The United States must enter into a period of selective bilateral diplomacy with Germany, and the Federal Republic must develop a deliberate and professional Amerikapolitik. The lack of understanding of the peculiarities of American political life and the mechanism and style of the American decision-making system is a weakness which must be overcome in the interest of both nations. The strengthening of Germany's relationship with the United States is as important as are American reappraisals of Atlanticism.

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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany has entered into a new phase. At the same time, the political ideas which currently are used to define the relationship - alliance and partnership - are becoming increasingly less accurate descriptions of it. German-American relations have only recently become the subject of systematic analysis in international relations. The emerging political content of the relationship has not been fully comprehended by either side. What tends to result is theoretical inarticulateness and diplomatic paralysis. Partly as a result of the growth of problems in the area of international economics, but also because of the separate development of national roles both countries have begun to view each other with greater detachment and with a more marked sense of objectivity. What this means is that the bilateral nature of German-American relations is emerging as a more vital political tendency than the community idea in which conflicts were either non-existent or subsumed under the principle of supranationalism. However, Germany and the United States, while acting more clearly as two nation-states, still base their relations to a considerable extent on their mutual alliance in NATO. The role of the German and American foreign offices, while theoretically of great importance given the bilateral nature of the relationship, has not been strengthened by the diffusion of national power and its delegation to a "higher" authority, NATO.

The deflection of national power to other planes of intercourse is a problem which has great strategic significance. The Federal Republic and the United States have a common interest in preventing the successful emergence of Soviet hegemony in Europe. However, both countries conduct their strategic activities in the NATO context. The strategic task which ought to be dealt with, the elaboration of congruent diplomacies on a bilateral basis between two sovereign nations, is neglected. Instead, both countries, by ignoring the reality of the bilateral nature of their relationship, continue to act in the realm of supranational coalition strategy. Strategy toward the Soviet Union is not what it could be, the congruent actions of sovereign nation-states.

The notion of threat which characterizes the NATO strategy of deterrence is another handicap to the development and implementation of national security policies. The nations of the West, by their seeming embarrassment at the persistence of nation-state rivalries and differences, have adopted a strategic doctrine which could favor the success of Soviet foreign policy ambitions. Since the Soviet Union continues to act as a 19th century Great Power with imperialist aims, it conducts its foreign policy activity along classic lines of power politics. Weaknesses which are inherent in a world of sovereign, and often rival competing nations - the West - are easily exploited by a power - the Soviet Union - which plays a straightforward game of imperial self-interest.

Since the Second World War, the West, under the leadership of

the United States has attempted to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union's power by the creation of fixed entities, both doctrinal and organizational. Both the doctrine of deterrence, and the organization of NATO have channelled the power of Western nation-states into a realm in which the contest between East and West has become asymmetrical. Since the Soviet Union conducts a diplomacy of flexibility - and this has been especially true since Khrushchev - containment of the offensive potential of such action must insure the political strength of the Western "positions". These positions, however, are not fixed and are even at times in a state of disharmony. In Europe, the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic, while potentially the most significant strategic relationship, is apt to become increasingly impotent because of the refusal of both sides to admit that there are conflicts of interest between them. The way to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic is to recognize the existence of conflicts of interest and to strengthen the means for coping with them.

This requires a conscious re-orientation of German and American foreign policy. The United States must enter into a period of selective bilateral diplomacy with Germany, and the Federal Republic must develop a professional Amerikapolitik. The strengthening of Germany's expertise on the United States is of major importance. This is necessary because, first, there is still a large amount of rhetoric, amateurishness and irrationality in Germany's relations

with the United States, attitudes which vacillate between outlandish praise for an American utopia, and pessimistic condemnation of an American wasteland. Apart from the attitudinal aspect of this shortcoming, the fact remains that the most vital component in Germany's national security policy is its relationship with the United States. The relationship with the United States is Germany's single most important foreign policy relationship and yet it remains, intellectually and governmentally, underdeveloped. The occasional lack of understanding of the peculiarities of American political life, the American style, and the mechanism of American government is a weakness of the German government which ought to be overcome in the interest of improving the relationship between the two countries. Germany's underdeveloped Amerikapolitik is the product of the postwar period, the Germans' neglect of or disdain for national identity, and the American policy of organizing Western defense in a way which would delay the emergence of such an identity. Although, as a policy this had sense after the War, when the idea of sovereign German national power was abhorrent, it is outdated and deserves to be replaced by a policy which encourages the growth of a national German identity and a national German security policy.

The result of adopting such a policy could be to achieve a necessary reorientation in Western strategy at a time when Western governments are highly disoriented. The task of reestablishing a union between national power and strategic vision is the precondition for building a lasting peace in Europe.

CHAPTER I

STRATEGIC DISORIENTATION AS A PROBLEM
OF GOVERNANCE

"If the foreign policy of a state is to be practical, it should be designed not in terms of some dream world but in terms of the realities of international relations, in terms of power politics. The international community is without government, without a central authority to preserve law and order, and it does not guarantee the member states either their territorial integrity, their political independence or their rights under international law. States exist, therefore, primarily in terms of their own strength or that of their protector states and, if they wish to maintain their independence, they must make the preservation or improvement of their power position the principal objective of foreign policy. Nations which renounce the power struggle and deliberately choose impotence will cease to influence international relations either for evil or for good and risk eventual absorption by more powerful neighbors."

Nicholas John Spykman

A nation does not need to choose impotence deliberately in order to become impotent. Impotence, like the British Empire in the 19th century, can be acquired in a fit of absentmindedness. It can arise not because a conscious act has been performed with the aim of weakening national power; national power can become disoriented because it is unconscious, or because its institutionalization fails to work. "The paradox of our world," wrote Henry Kissinger, "can be stated as follows: power has never been greater but never less useful."¹ Why should this be? How has it come about that power is impotent and the nation-state disoriented?

Twenty-six years ago the United States emerged from the Second World War as the uncontested center of international politics. The Fascist World had collapsed and the Axis alliance to achieve world order through conquest was broken. Russia was strong militarily, but internally weakened by years of hardship and by the constraints of Stalinist rule. The U.S. was the only nation left in the world which was both master in its own house and strong enough to play a global role in world politics. Not only was American power great enough to be a driving force in the governance of the West, but its central position in the international system was a vital one in the orientation of other nations. Their self-images and their practical policies relied heavily, politically, economically and psychologically, on the obvious and unquestioned position and power of the United States. Moreover, the United States was not only a great power, but the first superpower; the atomic monopoly of the U.S. made it reasonable for other nations to see themselves as belonging to an entirely different and inferior order of magnitude. The United States knew where it stood, and other nations knew where they stood and this commonly shared sense of having one's bearings provided Western power with its organic orientation.

This is no longer a tenable situation. Power and orientation no longer exist in union; the United States, while still a global power and still a leading nation in important areas of science and technology, is no longer the center of a stable political cosmology. What has changed since 1945 is not only a question of the paralysis of

American power, its unintended entanglement and strategic counter-productivity, but also a matter of the conceptual disorientation of that power with the result that not only the United States but its friends have lost their bearings together.

In a sense, this is not astonishing. If one could afford a philosophical view, one could observe the fact that human history has often been punctuated by severe orientational crises. In astronomy, for example, it was once thought the earth was the center of the universe. A geocentric cosmology then gave way to a solar-centric one which, in turn, yielded to the contemporary fixing of the earth's position at the fringe of one, rather minor galaxy. None of these shifts in centrism was easy, nor particularly flattering to those inclined to adopt an anthropocentric view of the universe. The phenomenon of a transformation in centricity occurs in many other forms as well, including political ones.

At the present time this is apparent not only in the ambiguities surrounding the discussion of the "post cold war era," a time in which the old bi-polar cosmology has become fuzzy. There are also ambiguities within what were formerly unitary camps. The Western world has developed a less clear view of the position of the United States in its own system, and the Communist world has experienced a similar kind of confusion in the Sino-Soviet split.

In spite of this evident fact, namely that the problem of orientation and disorientation, both conceptual and operational, is a generic one which is fundamental in political life, it has not

really been isolated and identified as a central problem in analyses of America's foreign policy impasse. Instead, recent writings, such as Stanley Hoffmann's "Gulliver's Troubles" point to another problem known as the "crisis of complexity." This expression is a shorthand way of referring to what is certainly a real issue, the explosive growth of factors and dimensions within any single, "small" foreign policy problem which require analytic synthesis. It is true that problems and their solutions have become more complicated; this is a general phenomenon. In most fields of scientific inquiry, a scholar, at one time, was able to master his subject and know all the other scholarly writings and problems connected with his field, biology, history, or classics. Those days are gone, and a contemporary researcher is often content to have mastered one part of a larger discipline. The evolution of the discipline itself has made this kind of specialization a necessary activity. For example, in aviation, it was once possible for a single person, or perhaps two or three, to design, build, test and fly an airplane. Nowadays, if one wants to build a jet airplane, the complex nature of such an aircraft requires people who are specialists in designing special riveting processes for wings. The effort needed to design and construct this subsystem of the aircraft would have gone into the design of the entire airplane, fifty or sixty years ago.

In international relations, in the day to day operations of a modern foreign office, new forms of specialization are required, people who are experts not only in precise area or country studies,

but who are familiar with such problems as travel regulations and patent law in the given country. The management of any single foreign policy area and relationship has indeed become a complicated matter and if one were to list all of the single issues in any given relationship which a foreign office is supposed to be competent to handle, the result would be staggering. It is also no wonder that, given this kind of situation, an observer of government in action may wonder how it is possible to digest all the information which the government must deal with. A facetious way of dealing with this is to recall the anecdote about the psychiatrist who, when asked how he could sit and listen, day after day, week after week, to the inner-most problems and burdens of his patients, sighed: "Who listens?" In real life, information goes unprocessed; it does so not because of irresponsibility but because of overload, because the processing and digestion of information is beyond the capacity of the staff assigned to it. Even though this happens infrequently, it nevertheless does point to the existence of a "crisis of complexity." This is a problem which affects all governments. For example, the need to coordinate Berlin policy by the three Western powers led to an ever-increasing complexity in their negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question. Simply the difficulty of finding a common denominator in policy is enough to cause headaches, but the attempt to review each new phase of negotiations in reference to the entire past history of the Berlin problem is a supremely taxing endeavor.

Seen in this way, "progress" in foreign policy means developing ever newer and higher levels of expertise to keep in line with diplomatic situations whose complexity threatens to develop at a faster rate than does the ability of a given foreign office to comprehend and control the evolution of the problem. Failure to develop such expertise can mean an erosion of a government's ability to remain competent in conducting foreign policy operations. In short: knowledge is power, not least at the daily tactical level of diplomatic negotiations.

Although the "crisis of complexity" is nothing which should be minimized as an issue, nor should the ability of government to develop higher levels of expertise be discouraged, the heart of the matter lies elsewhere. It is that unless foreign policy is concerned with the problem of governance and orientation it will overcome the bewilderment of government only in the field, but not at headquarters. To cope with the problem of the "crisis of complexity" is not sufficient. A more serious problem is the danger of the operational disorientation of national government, of the ability of a nation-state to locate itself in the world and to have a sense of direction. Expertise applied to a given situation is sterile if the experts fail to see the direction in which they are moving.

There are internal and external aspects of the functional disorientation of government. A government, as a national governance system, may be unable to synthesize its internal components. A large, unwieldy and unresponsive bureaucracy on the one hand, an anarchic

set of agencies on the other, may make it impossible for a government to come to terms with itself internally. In the experience of the United States this has been a serious matter.

"There flows out of Washington a continuous stream of rumor, tales of bickering, speculation, stories of selfish interest, charges, and countercharges. Abusive rivalries arise between the government agencies engaged in making policy, and even within a single agency different factions battle, each seeking allies in other agencies, among the members of Congress, from interest associations, and among the press. Officialdom, whether civil or military, is hardly neutral. It speaks, and inevitably it speaks as an advocate. The Army battles for ground forces, the Air Force for bombers, the 'Europe faction' in the State Department for policy benefiting NATO, and the 'Africa faction' for anticolonialist policies unsettling to our relations with Europe. All these many interests, organizations, and institutions - inside and outside the government - are joined in a struggle over the goals of government policy and over the means by which these goals shall be achieved. Instead of unity, there is conflict. Instead of a majestic procession, there are erratic zigs and zags. Instead of clarity and decisiveness, there are tangle and turmoil; instead of order, confusion."²

Politics is turmoil, "policy making is politics" and to speak of "governance" as the rational pursuit of goals, the purposeful and incremental exercise of power is to apply a perhaps impossible notion, namely that it is possible to achieve lasting domestic consensus. If the internal workings of a government are, in actuality, lacking in harmony - in the American case because of the way in which the Constitution separated governmental institutions - there can be no "functioning" and consistently oriented government. Instead, what emerges is a process of forward movement through

"disjointed incrementalism."³ Nevertheless, however true this kind of insight may be, namely that American government functions through internal competition, the result of the competition is foreign policy, since it adds up to the involvement of the United States in world politics. Of course, the involvement itself may be detrimental to the position of American power. In this case, the competitive nature of domestic politics may be more than just the normal workings of a somewhat unwieldy government. In such a case, the lack of unity in domestic politics can act as an impediment to policy - this is a dysfunction of governance.

Externally, dysfunctionality can derive from an inflexible or offensive environment which blocks the road along which a nation is moving. The ability of a nation to survive in competition or struggle with other nations depends upon its ability both to conceptualize and realize a route to be taken through such an environment. This is nothing more than the ability of a government to see its position strategically. Failing to see itself this way, and failing to devise a route to be taken leads to a situation in which national governance is not only functionally disoriented; here it is appropriate to speak of strategic disorientation.

The problem of strategic disorientation is particularly relevant in evaluating the relationship between East and West, a relationship which is still pivoted on questions of European security. A basic problem in Western security policy is to find an appropriate way to analyze and evaluate European security questions, in a way which is

conscious of strategic processes.

Too often, however, political vision has not been able to focus on this dimension of policy and has focused instead on the structure of Western power, or on purely internal questions inside the Western alliance. The great debate on nuclear strategy, however important it may have been, nevertheless was symptomatic of the potential for strategic disorientation in the West. To the extent that the alliance became a forum which discussed how nuclear policy could be concerted, it became inward-looking. The same danger exists in the current economic problems which have arisen within the Western camp; for example, the rift between the Common Market and the United States threatens to produce even more acrimonious debates than the old nuclear ones ever did.

It might be argued that such inward-looking concerns are no less vital, from the standpoint of power consolidation, than the harmonization of domestic components is for the functioning of a single national government. The point, however, is not that this is a silly concern, but rather that it is a one-sided concern which, if taken alone, completely eliminates external strategic problems from political consciousness.

Why should this be emphasized to such an extent? The fundamental reason for stressing the necessity of conscious strategic thought in the West is that, independently of anyone's thoughts or wishes in Western capitals, the world is divided in half. On the other side, the Soviet potential exists as a dynamic counterforce to Western

governance. As will be explained later, the Soviet potential exists in terms of process. The great strategic controversy between East and West is not one which is a duel between two fixed positions. In this controversial relationship there is no such thing as a status quo, and there is no such thing as bipolarity - if these concepts are understood as constants in international politics. Once again orienting concepts arise which, however comforting they may be for the analyst, are nothing which can be taken for granted as fixed points for navigational purposes. All orientational centers and schemes in international politics must be called into question on a routine basis. Strategic thought must free itself from irrelevant abstraction. Only the nation state remains the central unit, not a variable, in strategy.

FOOTNOTES

¹Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on Power and Diplomacy" in The Dimensions of Diplomacy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 21.

²Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 8. See also the excellent appraisal by John F. Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

³David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). This is the source of the expression.

CHAPTER II

TWO ASPECTS OF NATION-STATE DISORIENTATION

A. CONCEPTUAL DISORIENTATION

By and large, the conceptual disorientation of national power refers to various myths and illusions which a nation-state has of itself, other nations and the international system. Hans Morgenthau once identified four intellectual errors in American foreign policy: utopianism, legalism, sentimentalism and neoisolationism.

"Foreign policy, like all politics, is in its essence a struggle for power, waged by sovereign nations for national advantage. In this struggle there may be victory or defeat and, in between, longer or shorter stages of apparent inactivity and quiet. By its very nature this struggle is never ended, for the lust for power, and the fear of it, is never stilled. Thus the challenger of today may well be challenged tomorrow, and the challenge met tomorrow may well be followed by a new one the day after. The best a nation longing for tranquility and peace can expect is to be passed by for a time in the stream of events; but it must ever be ready to man the ramparts for defense or attack. In the life of nations peace is only respite from trouble - or the permanent peace of extinction.

These stark and simple facts of the real political world have been replaced in the American mind by the picture of a political world that never existed, but whose reality . . . appears only too plausible."¹

Continuing his attack on foreign policy illusions, Morgenthau argued that "the same illusory mode of thought which disarmed the United States militarily at the end of the two World Wars made it impotent politically The nature of this utopian, non-

political approach is strikingly revealed in a remark that General Deane, the chief of the United States Military Mission in Moscow during the Second World War, makes in his memoirs about the conference at Terheran:

"Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the Conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection of our President, but his apparent indecision was probably the direct result of our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the Anglo-American forces in Western, not Southern Europe; Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved and British interests best served if the Anglo-Americans as well as the Russians participated in the occupation of the Balkans.

In other words, for Churchill and Stalin the Second World War was the instrument of a foreign policy whose objectives had existed before the outbreak of hostilities, and were bound to continue to exist when the war had come to an end. For Roosevelt, as has been pointed out in another context, the war was an end in itself, its purpose exhausted with total victory and unconditional surrender."²

The wartime experience of the United States demonstrated that it had not yet reached a mature and harmonious understanding of Realpolitik. Even though it was the strongest Western power, and would become the West's orientational center, its conceptual and strategic faculties were by no means perfect. Its leadership role did not rest on a comprehensive and authoritative strategy but was, to a certain extent, accidental. The shortcomings of the United States' theory and practice of international affairs have been partially rectified since 1945, but the utopianism of American

foreign policy still continues to plague it in the most important area of its domain, in the power struggle with the Soviet Union in Europe.

The roots of this impotence lie in the still unmastered legacy of the Second World War. The conceptual confusion of this period resulted in the commitment of the United States to a postwar world order which it believed would transcend national conflicts of interest. For example,

"For the United States the new world organization in the form of the United Nations was a substitute for power politics; it was supposed to do away with the balance of power, spheres of influence, alliances, the very policies seeking national advantage and aggrandizement. In one word, the United Nations was an end in itself, the ultimate end of American foreign policy."³

The unwillingness of American policy-makers to function in the nation-state context is not only an intellectual error; this permanent identity crisis of the United States also has operational aspects. The United States has had to mature not only in terms of its self-image, but as a power which could comprehend the instrumental nature of warfare. In 1944, even while riding the crest of the wave, the United States had no integral conception of politics and warfare.

Cordell Hull's condemnation of the idea of a balance of power and spheres of influence hardly narrowed the gap between a utopian and a realistic approach to politics.

"The reason for this condemnation must again be looked for in the utopian approach to foreign policy, an approach of which Mr. Hull was the champion and Mr. Roosevelt the hesitant and not always reliable supporter."⁴

To be sure, the utopian approach of Hull may have had other reasons.

"President Roosevelt's virtual exclusion of Secretary Hull from high-policy decisions during the war - led directly to the theoretical and unreal nature of the State Department's - and hence the Government's thinking on postwar problems. Largely detached from the practicalities of current problems and power relationships, the Department under Mr. Hull became absorbed in platonic planning of a utopia, in a sort of mechanistic idealism. Perhaps, given the nature of the current problems, of the two men, and of the tendency to accept dichotomy between foreign and military policy, this would have occurred in any event. But it accentuated the isolation of the Secretary and the Department in a land of dreams."⁵

B. OPERATIONAL DISORIENTATION

"There is a sense in which the Department of State is at war. We are engaged in vital activities on many active fronts. The task is not, therefore, to make the equivalent of contingency plans for certain abstract future circumstances; the task is to conceive of specific objectives in particular theaters of activity and to determine how to move forward towards those objectives under rapidly changing operational circumstances."

W.W. Rostow

The second aspect of the disorientation of the nation state is the operational one. The myths and illusions of government, for example the idea that international organizations will supercede an international system characterized by a struggle for power and conflicts of interest among nation-states, are at worst sand thrown in the navigator's eyes. Far more frustrating is the quicksand in

which he is liable to walk.

In its relations with Europe since the Second World War and in its policy toward European security, the United States appeared, shortly after the War had ended, to have learned the lesson that new forms of diplomacy and engagement were necessary to offset the dangers posed by Soviet domination in the East. In rapid succession, the United States was able to field a policy of containment, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance.

As these plans were implemented, it began to be clear that the objective of the United States was to develop an entanglement with Europe, not a policy toward individual European countries. The Atlantic Alliance evolved into the most highly developed form of transatlantic relationship and NATO became synonymous with America's European policy.

Within the overall framework of this supreme policy, there was still room for special relationships of the United States with other Western European countries, France and/or Great Britain; these were relationships based on traditional cultural and linguistic ties, wartime alliance, and sentiment. But for the maintenance of the political balance of the superpowers in Europe, the position of and relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany rapidly became the decisive relationship, not just a special one. Conversely, support of the Federal Republic's foreign policy, that is its Eastern policy, may appear to be guaranteed by progress in the co-operation it is able to achieve with other Western European countries,

but its room for maneuver would shrink at once if the support of the United States were lost.

The European ties of the United States and the Western tie of the Federal Republic comprise the central, vital content of German-American relations, the crucial relationship. This means, above all, the maintenance of a good German relationship with the United States and the preservation of a solid backing of Germany by the United States.⁶

American analysis of this relationship is that it illustrates interdependence.

"The best interests of the United States and her allies in the 1960's and into the 1970's - which, in these matters, is the 'foreseeable future' - lie in the close entanglement of the United States with Europe and the further development of military integration within the alliance. But within this transatlantic entanglement the European allies must assume a larger share of NATO's collective responsibilities (including the control of nuclear weapons) and material burdens (especially those that support a capacity for non-nuclear resistance) which they continue to increase their political and economic solidarity as a third, but interdependent, force in the world balance of power."⁷

According to this point of view, entanglement equals interdependence. The progressive implementation of the wishes of NATO's founding fathers will maintain a strong Western bloc whose collective power and collective interstitial decisions will serve a) the national interests of the Western powers, and b) the cause of a European power balance. This balance must ultimately be based on the incremental sophistication of the German-American relationship

which all parties regard as the most important one, strategically speaking.

As Morgenthau points out, "The United States has one fundamental goal: the prevention of a drastic change in the world balance of power through an Eastern orientation of a united Germany."⁸ However, the equation of entanglement/interdependence with security and with strategic success is questionable. Interdependence is not a constant in international relations. The United States

"... has made common cause with Germany in maintaining the illusion that Germany's Western orientation will be the instrument for the realization of its national aims. This illusion has created a schizophrenia in the German mind by causing it to set itself objectives that cannot be achieved by the means chosen. America has also created a schizophrenia for itself: Its commitment to the German non-recognition of the European status quo is incompatible with its search for an accommodation with the Soviet Union. The United States has the extremely difficult task to disentangle itself from these two contradictions without impairing its relations with Germany and in the end driving Germany into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union."⁹

One can see that two ideas have characterized German-American relations since the Second World war. The first is that the two countries should be joined in an alliance, and purposely entangled in each other's foreign policies. By creating a web of inter-penetration, the power of the West can be increased, and the fundamental goal of preserving a world power balance in Europe can be realized. Since 1945, the question of Germany's future in Europe at its most basic level has been the question of whether its strength

should serve Western or Soviet interests. "To succeed in the struggle with the East we need in Germany, as in other parts of the free world, a consolidated non-totalitarian government assured of broad popular backing; we need economic progress enough to assure a high degree of mass satisfaction; we need above all a Germany willing and capable of cooperating with its Western neighbors, a West Germany on whose alignment with us we can rely."¹⁰ Seen in this way, it was believed that the addition of German power to American power would create a stable power relationship in Europe, with the overriding aim of containing the Soviet Union. "The growth of Soviet power requires the growth of counter-power among those nations which are not willing to concede Soviet Hegemony."¹¹

The second idea is that the alliance between Germany and the United States has been based on irrational premises and that the resulting relationship therefore contains a number of timebombs. One premise was that German adherence to the West would lead to unification; another premise was that American support of German policy would lead to a reduction of the American burden in Europe. Since, it can be argued, neither of these premises shows any sign of paying off, adherence to them as the cornerstones of policy leads to an increasingly frustrated relationship. In fact, the frustrations could threaten to become so large that policy-making in the context of an American-German alliance would become a holding operation to prevent a rapid deterioration of the inner-Western system rather than an outward looking implementation of the strategic

goals represented by the first idea.

There are two frequent interpretations, therefore, of German-American relations.

a) It is an alliance which develops a counterbalance to the threat of Soviet hegemony in Europe.

b) It is an entanglement which develops counterproductively to the strategic aim of deterrence and containment.

Of these two interpretations, it is the second which needs further explication. The entanglement of the United States and the Federal Republic in each other's foreign policies to the detriment of stable national orientations has been in part the result of mistaken conceptions which have informed national strategy in the postwar period. But unless one also understands the way in which strategic paralysis has resulted from operational disorientation, the entanglement of these nation-states will worsen and there can be no resolution of the paradox in which they are caught.

FOOTNOTES

¹Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 92.

²Ibid., pp. 96-97.

³Ibid., p. 100.

⁴Ibid., p. 98.

⁵Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 88. For further discussion of the role played by Secretary Hull, see Donald F. Drummond, "Cordell Hull" in An Uncertain Tradition, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

⁶This point is developed in Uwe Nerlich, Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten in Europa als Problem der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Beziehungen in den Siebziger Jahren (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-AP 1032, Ebenhausen, March 1970), p. 14.

⁷Robert E. Osgood, NATO, The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 348.

⁸Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 345.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Arnold Wolfers, West Germany - Protectorate or Ally (New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1950, Memorandum No. 35), p. 2.

¹¹Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 17.

CHAPTER III

OSTPOLITIK AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF OPERATIONAL COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY

The sober truth is that Ostpolitik is in the
process of stagnating.

Handelsblatt

The 1960's and early part of the 1970's were years which accelerated the strategic importance of the policy of the Federal Republic toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. German Ostpolitik became a subject of widespread interest in both East and West because it represented the development of what appeared to be a truly German initiative in foreign affairs activity. The possibility that Germany could carry out a function as the motor of detente in Europe made the subject of Ostpolitik become more than an important development. It became the culmination of detente strategy in Europe, a horse on which the entire NATO alliance had decided to bet.¹

Before it is possible to consider the strategic dimension of Ostpolitik, however, the structural conditions of German security policy should be outlined again.

All nations carry out their security policies not in an abstract realm but under concrete conditions. The Federal Republic's basic national security policy orientation is to strike a favorable balance between Western and Eastern dimensions. Because German

security policy is conceived of as requiring a balance in these dimensions, the real framework in which it can operate has very simple limits.² The Federal Republic's security rests on two pillars, its defence capability and its ability to reduce the threat from outside. In order to maintain a stable and strong defence posture, the Federal Republic is firmly rooted in the Atlantic Alliance. This is the Western dimension of its national security policy. It is defined by the relationship of the Federal Republic to Western integration, and to the United States - largely a matter of problems concerning the American deterrent and American troop presence.

Policy dealing with attempting a reduction in external threat is expressed in the complex activity, Ostpolitik. The Federal Republic's problems with its Eastern neighbors have been a mixture of traditional state rivalry with political problems. The legacy of fear of Germany in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the need of the Communists to maintain internal tension, was coupled with the rapid growth of Warsaw Pact forces. This was a constant impetus for German efforts to reduce a climate of mistrust in Central Europe. At the same time, the Federal Republic was driven by the need to atone for its past deeds in the East. For this reason, the Federal Republic was compelled to lock itself into a system of complex negotiations.

In its diplomacy toward the East, the Federal Republic must constantly weigh several factors against each other, such as relations with the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the West Berlin Senate. The

result is that it has become exceedingly difficult to find a common denominator. The current phase of negotiations, which also includes discussions with East Germany (the Bahr-Kohl talks), is the most complicated system of diplomacy since the war.

The policy of reducing the threat from the East, which is the essence of the strategic function of Ostpolitik, therefore depends firstly on the ability of the German government to master the intricacies of multidimensional diplomacy. This is not only a question of expertise. Bonn must be able to maintain sufficient stamina to conduct a series of highly arduous negotiations over a protracted period without allowing the tactical details of each individual set of negotiations to become so diffuse and perplexing that the strategic goal founders on tactical quicksand. This is easier said than done.

It must be remembered that the German government has in a sense been forced into the position of having to attempt a congruent, if not synchronized, Ostpolitik. Its earlier attempts at national diplomacy with the Bloc countries met with considerable hostility from various segments of the Eastern leaderships and was construed as part of a perfidious West German attempt to divide the Socialist camp. Since 1968, the government of the Federal Republic has stressed repeatedly that it is not interested in splitting the countries of Eastern Europe and, instead, has emphasized in its Ostpolitik under Chancellor Brandt the necessity of dealing with the East as a whole. The policy of peace which Brandt has been

pursuing toward the East has been based on the idea of desiring an improvement of relations with all of the Eastern European states. Nevertheless, this has had the effect of putting pressure on each sector of the negotiations with the East. That is, in order to avoid the accusation that it is creating difficulties in any one sector of negotiations, the Federal Republic is apt to feel the need to make compromises in this sector so that the system as a whole doesn't suffer. This places severe strains on the German Foreign Office's attempt to preserve an autonomous sense of timing in its diplomacy and lays it open to charges of acting under "Zugzwang," of having to make a forced sacrifice move as in chess.

The fact is that because of the complexity in timing the Eastern negotiations, there is a real danger that the Federal Republic will be forced to make accommodations. "Brandt is hunting for some kind of political trophy in the East, but it looks as though he himself is the hunted . . . The Eastern policy initiative has led German reunification policy rapidly into a thicket and has exposed Bonn to pressure from the East which makes free movement difficult."³ Few politicians in Germany have the ironical view that the Federal Republic has become a "prisoner of its Eastern policy". Most German observers see Eastern diplomacy in more straightforward terms and do not ponder whether Ostpolitik is an initiative or a trap.⁴

The relations of the Federal Republic with Czechoslovakia are a case in point. The visit of State Secretary Paul Frank of the Bonn Foreign Office to Prague at the end of March, 1971, brought

into focus the last remaining problem in the relations of West Germany to its neighbors in the East, a problem which has its roots in the annexation of the Sudetenland by Hitler. Prague indicated to the Germans that it regarded the Munich Agreement of 1938 as invalid from the start, in fact the Czechs made this an unconditional demand. For the Czechs, the Munich Agreement is felt to be a kind of national traumatic experience which they have fought - in exile in the Second World War and afterwards - as the way to restore Czechoslovakia's national integrity.

"The Federal Government is ready in principle to declare the Munich Agreement as invalid dating back very far. The international lawyers have examined this problem in recent months from all angles. They came to the conclusion that the correct date is the day of the German march into Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. At that time, Hitler publicly violated the Munich agreement. By annulling the Agreement at this time, the Federal Republic would also find itself in accord with the Western Powers who agreed to declare the Agreement void during the Second World War, however not from the start.

An insurmountable obstacle to the Federal Republic's fulfillment of Prague's demand for an 'ex tunc' annulment is contained in the general principles of international law. There is no doubt that the Munich Agreement was recognized, at least for a time, as valid by all concerned, even if the Agreement originated under pressure. If the Czechoslovakian demand were met, this would introduce the greatest insecurity into international law. Because then a state could withdraw at any time from an international treaty by claiming that it had become a party to the treaty under pressure. Only a few international treaties originate without pressure - for example, many states signed the non-proliferation treaty only under a certain amount of pressure. Precisely

because the Federal Republic - in contradistinction to Hitler's Reich - is serious about international obligations, it cannot agree to an annulment of the Munich Agreement from the start - all German parties share this view. It has long since gone along with Prague's concrete wishes by declaring that it will not construct territorial demands from the Munich Agreement. With the annulment dated back to March, 1939, it would go an important step further. But beyond that the path of the Federal Republic is blocked."⁵

This stalemate, in which the historical identity of the Czechs is counterposed to the legal identity of the Germans is a trenchant illustration of the quality of complexity which the German Foreign Office must contend with in its Eastern diplomacy. The difficulty in this case is not so much a matter of having insufficient knowledge of concrete issues, or of disagreement over how a certain border is to be drawn. The clash is between two European historical consciousnesses and is nothing which can be resolved either through technical expertise or through patience and good will. Manifestly, this is the kind of problem which approaches being a diplomat's nightmare. At the same time, in the strategic thinking of the Western alliance, it is precisely this problem which must be "solved" if there is to be progress in Ostpolitik. The German government is therefore under pressure not only because of the internal logic of Ostpolitik itself. It has a duty to carry out because its function as the motor of detente is central to Western strategy. Therefore a deep conflict arises within the highest levels of the Federal Republic's political self-conceptions and identities. The Federal Republic is torn, politically, between

being a European power whose power orientation is channeled into a detente strategy, and a European nation which must act on the lessons of past experience. Having made a fundamental commitment to legality in international relations, the German government is bound to a form of "good behavior". This requires a quality of political awareness which is extremely difficult to harmonize with another lesson - its loyalty to its Western allies, particularly to the United States. The Federal Republic is committed at the same time to being a good NATO ally, and to working in close and active coordination with Western, particularly American, strategy. This in turn has called for Germany to seek a dynamic role in its relationship with the Eastern bloc. But in the process of carrying out this role, the Federal Republic invokes spirits which militate against this policy. Unfortunately, there are other problems connected with the Eastern policy as well.

Another hindrance to a simple Eastern policy is that the idea of "offensive detente" has not been an easy one for many Germans to comprehend.⁶ One of the most harmful side-effects of the Ostpolitik experiment has been to create a large measure of confusion within the West Germany body politic. Essentially, the question here is whether or not the policy of seeking detente with the East is one which maintains a political balance in Europe, or whether the diplomatic advantages which derive from Ostpolitik will be largely or exclusively Eastern ones. The word "detente" means one thing to the strategist, but in common sense usage it means, simply, relaxation and nothing

more. As was explained earlier in this analysis, there is a general climate of relaxation in Europe, a feeling that any threat from the East which might have existed previously is no longer present and that the Soviet Union and its allies have become passive members of an emerging all-European system. The reality of this feeling cannot be ignored, nor can one ignore the widespread belief that strategic thinking itself has become passe, an attitudinal relic of a bygone age, the Cold War. For this reason, there is great reluctance, in West Germany no less than in other European countries, to accept the idea that detente is not a mood, but a strategy, and thus the continuation of the "Cold War" by more complicated means. "Detente policy is nothing other than an extension of balance of power security policy by other means."⁷

This understanding of detente is an acquired taste, the result of a deliberate effort to comprehend the historical context of European politics and is in competition with other political understandings. What this means is that the political identity of the Federal Republic has become multidimensional; the Federal Republic has become politicized in a way which was unknown in the Adenauer years.⁸ In an abstract sense, this is a welcome development if one considers only the aspect of the problem which sees political controversy as a good thing in itself, as a way of strengthening the fibers of a political system by challenging old ideas with new ones. The foreign policy debate in the Federal Republic is, if one supports this dimension of the problem, a sign of increasing maturity of the

German political system. What this interpretation ignores, however, is that maturation can occur in other ways as well. That is, strategic thought itself can progress into higher levels of conceptualization; maturation can also mean the improvement of strategy, not only its rejection.

The revitalization of the foreign policy debate in the Federal Republic, while not to be exaggerated, is nevertheless somewhat reminiscent of the parliamentary debates which occurred back in the 1950's over questions of Germany's foreign policy. The confusion over the benefits and costs of Ostpolitik, its strategic rather than domestic psychological dimension, came out during the discussion in the Bundestag which followed Chancellor Brandt's State of the Nation address in January, 1971. In a challenge to Brandt's policy, the leader of the CDU/CSU Opposition, Rainer Barzel, asked the Chancellor:

"You said that one side is enough to start a crisis, but that all sides are needed to keep the peace. And at the same time, you want to dismantle 'confrontation thinking.' Where, Herr Chancellor, we ask, is the other side, the partner, the like-minded side? If it doesn't exist, where is the real basis of your policy?"⁹

Barzel's skepticism about the benefits of Ostpolitik arose from his belief that "If we point to the state of the Germans in Germany and make this the main yardstick, then we are acting in our central, vital interest and doing no more than our duty."¹⁰ The domestic debate over the concept of detente through Ostpolitik centered on the question of the priority of the inner-German sector of the

Eastern policy.

The Opposition argued that without a tangible relaxation in relations with the East Germans and without significant improvement in the Berlin question, there could be no meaningful discussion of Ostpolitik. The domestic challenge to the Federal Republic's foreign policy lay in the confusion over the manner in which liberalization could come to East Germany. How was this to occur? As the result of a conscious and deliberate policy, or as an unintended side-effect, or as the result of a long evolution of the European system itself? Ambiguity arose over the question whether detente was, as the SPD tried to claim, an outward-looking policy initiative. The government didn't make sufficiently clear the relationship between the goal of an overall reduction in the threat from the East - detente's contribution to balancing out the interests of the Eastern and Western alliances - and the problem of the specific reduction of tension in the Federal Republic's relations with the GDR. The strategic problem of inter-alliance relations was emphasized more than the "domestic" problem of inner-German relations. The lack of clarity on this relationship was furthered in turn by the psychological dimension of the problem. The dismantling of confrontational thinking was "easier" in relations with the Soviet and Eastern Europeans than with the GDR which remained, for the West Germans, still the most obstinate and militant Eastern European regime.

In a sense, the accusations of the Opposition were part of its job as an opposition party, an out-party which, by nature, is supposed

to challenge the party in power. Likewise, the SPD could regard the Opposition, being out of power, as having been "spoiled" by many years in office. When the CDU was in power the going had been somewhat easier because of the overall constellation of forces in the European area, and because a general aura of well-being had characterized the years of the Economic Miracle. By the end of the 1960's, the Federal Republic had entered into a more difficult period in its economic life and now the SPD, as the party in power, was not able to govern with the same sense of having leeway in all directions.

In spite of these explanations of the CDU/CSU's viewpoint, it's skeptical attitude toward Brandt's Ostpolitik was not just the last gasp of an obsolescent party. After all, the point of view that the present situation involves a number of painful ironies was also expressed, to the consternation of many, by Herbert Wehner of the SPD at the Bundespressekonferenz on January 4, 1971, when he said: "German policy cannot retreat from these treaties [of Moscow and Warsaw] without there being a disaster of reunification policy." Wehner's argument was that there was no alternative to what Germany was now doing, and that, moreover, by putting the inner-German relationship in the position of primacy in the Ostpolitik complex, it would, "help, even if unintentionally, the GDR chiefs to get a veto position. This must be said for tactical reasons, if for no other ones."

Thus, the differences between SPD and CDU on the question of

Ostpolitik was a conflict over the correct means, not over the goal, of achieving a *modus vivendi* with the East. The strategic difference between the CDU and SPD was that the SPD was concerned with maintaining a working balance of already existing forces, whereas the CDU was concerned with ways of offsetting a shift in the balance which had occurred with the rise of the Soviet Union to a position of preponderance on the European continent. The SPD acted on the basis of believing that it was still strong enough, although under pressure of time. The CDU opposed this action because of its uncertainty whether the policy was in fact a move from strength. The fear of the CDU was that the SPD's policy was reckless, hurried, and premature.¹¹

This internal split - even polarization - over Ostpolitik, cannot, in the long run, be regarded unreservedly as a contribution to the Federal Republic's maturity. The essential feature of one party's attack on the other was the belief that the strategy of the other party was either incompetent or opportunist. The result of this was an aggravation of a leadership crisis which already existed in the Federal Republic. Such a crisis could easily provide an opening for the Eastern Bloc if the Communist regimes were still interested in capitalizing on West German weaknesses.

A third problem connected with Ostpolitik concerns its dynamics. As the motor of detente, German Ostpolitik required a certain amount of psychic energy to run. The psychology of detente, from a domestic point of view, was based primarily on a deep-seated wish of the German government to disassociate itself from the 1933-45 period.

This is a wish which has already been seen as central to its legal thinking in foreign policy as well. The commitment to make a clean sweep and to overcome the past meant that the German government was genuinely committed to purging itself of any guilt which had accumulated in the years of the National Socialist tyranny. The government of the Federal Republic made it part of its policy of seeking reduction of tension with the East to understand the security needs of its Eastern neighbors. The political leadership of the Federal Republic was amply sensitive to the traumatic experience of Eastern Europeans with Germany. Thus one of the most important aims of Ostpolitik became the elimination, or calming, of Eastern European fears of the Germans. The way to do this was to demonstrate that one had become a different kind of German, a person who desired to get the past out of his system. This craving for acceptance as the builders of a better Germany, and the wish for expiation, the elimination of the historical-psychological itch of shame, was the steam in the engine of detente. This is what made the Federal Republic a "self-starter", able to act independently of any other country as the sole agent of detente. This is a principal reason that made Germans say that Ostpolitik was their own business, a highly private and personal matter which they themselves could do and which was a concern of their's alone.

Although there is now some skepticism that this momentum can be maintained, initially the policy of the SPD toward the East was presented in a psychologically positive way.

"Why is Ostpolitik so controversial and gets so much attention, although material results are hardly evident?" asked the leading West German Socialist theoretical journal. "To this question there is a very simple answer: It has a certain fascination if, instead of talking about Ostpolitik, Ostpolitik is made; if a start is made in negotiations in an area where polemics held sway long enough."¹²

Ostpolitik, at the time of its inception, was widely regarded as a significant policy initiative whose implications were also felt in Washington. Commenting on what was then regarded as Bonn's "key role" in European diplomacy, one writer enthused that there "arises for the American experts indirectly a slow but clear shift of the 'German problem' into a situation of expanded German competence and responsibility."¹³ Theo Sommer, a close observer of European developments, was moved to write that "Americans no longer have the exclusive initiative in Europe - there is a bitter limit to a superpower's room for maneuver."¹⁴ The feeling that Bonn had finally broken out of the strategic stalemate and was ploughing new ground also led a leading West German Socialist to state categorically that "The Ulbricht group can block and make more difficult the process of detente and the paths toward peace and new forms of peoples' living together here and there, but it cannot stop the historical process itself."¹⁵

The government of the Federal Republic had succeeded in conveying the impression that its moves toward detente were indeed steps beyond a stalemate and into a brighter future. Any doubts of other

Europeans were dismissed as being irrelevant. The Federal Republic assured its European friends that it was unnecessary to fear another Rapallo and too close attachment to the Russians, or that Germany would carry out a seesaw policy between East and West.¹⁶ The influential "Handelsblatt" empathized with but dismissed French criticisms and mistrust which were based on fears that the word "Ostpolitik" sounded a bit like Bismarck or Hitler, or that Ostpolitik would actually lead to reunification and create a greater Germany.¹⁷

The government was able also to contend with the major domestic criticisms levelled at it by the CDU. These were that a) The Germans' right to self-determination is endangered, b) no boundary definitions should be made before a peace treaty, c) inner-German improvements are necessary first, d) the status of Berlin is not assured, and e) the foundations of the Western alliance are threatened.¹⁸

These criticisms in turn added up to still bigger charges by the CDU that since:

1. The interest of the Soviet Union in Europe is to cement the status quo,
2. German contacts with the East legitimize the system of unfreedom in these states. As a result,
3. The failure of these contact would leave Europe in a more exposed position. Therefore,
4. The government is carrying out a policy of appeasement, not detente.¹⁹

The government answered simply that it was conducting a policy

of "calculated risk" and that it was able to hold its own.²⁰

There remained one dimension of Ostpolitik, however, in which the German government acted with noticeably less self-assurance than in its reaction to its European friends or to its own domestic opposition. The Eastern policy initiatives stirred up considerable comment in Washington, largely on the part of prominent figures of previous administrations who were, nonetheless, still associated with contemporary American policy toward Germany. By the end of 1970, the notion that a serious rift had developed between the U.S. and the Federal Republic had gained common currency.

"Although the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed how illusory a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union is, my fears do not refer to the substance or the goals of the Chancellor's efforts but to the speed with which he moved and to the fact that he did not insist on serious concessions from the Soviet side," remarked a highly respected American political figure.²¹ The fear that Germany was acting adventurously was at least one which, in this case, was clearly expressed. More often, however, a climate of opinion existed in which ill-defined anxieties bred inflated fears of a major deterioration in transatlantic relations.

"The watchword of American European policy during both of the first Nixon years was passivity, badly wrapped in the euphemistic principle that the leading power of the alliance cannot speak for its partners any longer but must, rather, be an equal partner. . . . These to some extent brilliant people know full well that a leading power which doesn't lead creates a vacuum. Not to lead is no saving therapy, but rather a taxing of the Alliance. The longer one sweeps conflicts of

interest under the prayer rug of the detente ritual, the more misunderstandings pile up and the more difficult it becomes to overcome them."²²

The U.S. Department of State was moved to make a clear statement that the climate of fear was ungrounded, and that there were, in fact, no conflicts of interest. The spokesman for the Department of State, McCloskey, declared that the American government supported and encouraged Brandt's attempts to improve relations with the Federal Republic's Eastern neighbors.

"The rumors about Washington's position in the question of Eastern policy were assuming grotesque forms - could one really imagine that official Washington, if it really were against this policy, would let underground murmurings suffice and permit the Secretary of State to keep on cheerfully supporting this policy in daily diplomatic work? If Nixon and Kissinger really thought Ostpolitik dangerous as it is conducted now, or if they rejected it, they would doubtless have the opportunity to say this loud and clear."²³

Officially, Washington considered the storm which had arisen over its supposed criticism of Ostpolitik to be a tempest in a teapot. Whatever criticisms had arisen were the products of oversimplification; Washington was as skeptical not of the course which the German government was following, but of its long-term results. This skepticism, although never expressed out loud, was basically the view that the entire structure of German diplomacy had to be viewed with a certain amount of irony. In this case, as in many others in diplomatic life, the choice to be made in foreign policy was a choice among unpleasant alternatives. In this sense, there was agreement with Wehner's conclusion that there was no alternative to what the German government

was doing. That is, Ostpolitik was something which had to be done and simultaneously was something which was not commendable in ideal terms. The conflict, if one wants to call it that, between the Americans and the Germans, was not a conflict of interest, since both countries "favored" a detente policy. The problem was a more subtle one, in which the American skepticism of success in foreign policy toward the East confronted a comparatively naive view of what foreign policy could achieve.

The Germans had a qualitatively different relationship to the wielding of power than the Americans. Their postwar foreign policy experience, although not easy, had been relatively sheltered. On the other hand, in the course of exercising its superpower role in world politics, and particularly as the result of enormous frustrations in Southeast Asia, the United States had developed an attitude toward dealing with the East which left little room for euphoria. Thus, the privately held conviction in Washington was that Bonn had taken a step which was, at best, a well-considered gamble. Bonn would have to assume a full measure of responsibility for its bet. (This, incidentally, was not necessarily the NATO position on Bonn's Eastern policy.) Washington could only wish Bonn the best of luck and give a kind of moral support to Chancellor Brandt. It had little desire to become entangled in the finer points of Ostpolitik - except for Berlin which was a problem of a different dimension of East-West diplomacy anyway. Its behavior in this regard was an act of problem-avoidance, not of detente manage-

ment. Washington appeared to have forfeited its strategic control over German foreign policy.

This aspect of German-American relations was highlighted by a sudden visit of the Minister in the Chancellor's Office, Horst Ehmke, to Washington. This visit had not been announced either in Washington or Bonn and it became the subject of considerable speculation (although it was stated during the visit that it had been planned well in advance). Regardless of its substance, Ehmke's trip gave the appearance of a crisis of confidence in German-American relations.²⁴

Although this visit raised the question of divergent German and American statecraft, the character of the divergence was widely interpreted as a conflict between two policies; American and German Eastern policies were supposedly out of phase. It is debatable, however, whether the notion of a conflict between German and American policies is what should be stressed. Instead, the Federal Republic and the United States had become involved in a much more perplexing situation.

First of all, it must be borne in mind that the United States had begun to adopt a hands-off attitude toward German foreign policy. This fact was clearly expressed by a leading representative of the American Government. "While attempting to keep our allies abreast of our own negotiating activities, we are welcoming and encouraging their own efforts, particularly those of West Germany, to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe."²⁵ The American Government hoped Ostpolitik would become an independent German foreign policy activity which would relieve it of part of its European burdens.

For its part, the Federal Republic acted in precisely the opposite way, as though its foreign policy were still dependent on the active engagement of the United States. Since German theorists continued to emphasize the integral unity of their foreign policy, policy in the East could not be separated in the slightest from Bonn's model behavior in the West. Preserving an attitude of adhering to the letter of the Alliance law, and believing that this was in accordance with the wishes of the United States, the Federal Republic acted in the only way it knew how, according to its own analysis of the structure of its possible security movement. Thus, while Washington was counting on Bonn's self-reliance, Bonn was relying on Washington.

It has already been seen that the NATO idea of using Ostpolitik as a policy initiative toward the East encountered difficulties. Negotiating detente had turned into a more laborious process than had been expected. Secondly, in addition to slowing down the Federal Republic in the East, Ostpolitik created domestic political confusion in the Federal Republic and aggravated leadership tensions between the two major German political parties. Finally, and most significantly, Ostpolitik worsened German-American relations. To the United States it meant burden-sharing and Germanizing German foreign policy. To the Federal Republic it meant preserving U.S. involvement. Obviously, these two goals were incompatible. Ostpolitik had become operationally counterproductive.

FOOTNOTES

¹The notion that it is possible to play German roulette is also found in Richard and Anna Merritt's booklet, West Germany Enters the Seventies (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 205, April 1971). "Despite its solid standing in the world political community, economic strength and considerable success in attaining its international goals, the FRG's foreign policy is extremely fragile. It rests essentially on three gambles." P. 56.

²Two succinct analyses of structural limitations in German foreign policy are Martin Saeter, Okkupation, Integration, Gleichberechtigung (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 1967), and Ulrich Scheuner, "Die aussenpolitischen Probleme der neuen Bundesregierung", Aussenpolitik nach der Wahl des 6. Bundestages (Opladen: C.W. Leske, 1969). For an analysis of German defense policy's structural limits, see Dieter Haack, "Die Ostpolitik der Bundesregierung und ihr Verhältnis zum atlantischen Bündnis", Wehrkunde, Vol. 20, No. 4 (April 1971).

³Fred Luchsinger, "Bonn - Gefangener des Ostpolitik", Neue Züricher Zeitung (February 15, 1970).

⁴German analyses, however, do not lack subtlety. See Wolfgang Wagner, "Voraussetzungen und Folgen der deutschen Ostpolitik", Europa Archiv, No. 17 (September 10, 1970).

⁵Wolfgang Wagner, "Zwischen Trauma und Völkerrecht", the Bonn General-Anzeiger (April 14, 1971), p. 10.

⁶The German Press Office has been criticized for failing to translate the nuances of this idea into terms the German public can comprehend. For an undiluted exposition see Peter Bender, Offensive Entspannung (Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1965).

⁷Helmut Schmidt claims he said this in the form of a pun. See the record of the Deutscher Bundestag, 93rd Meeting, January 28, 1971, p. 5091.

⁸See Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer Era (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1966).

⁹In the record of the Bundestag, op. cit., p. 5053.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 5052.

¹¹The idea that Bonn had bitten off more than it could chew is found in Richard von Weizsäcker's skeptical article, "Keine Entspannung ohne Gleichgewicht", Die Zeit (November 6, 1970), p. 40.

¹²"Es gibt wieder deutsche Politik", Die Neue Gesellschaft, Vol. 17, No. 3 (May/June, 1970), p. 286.

¹³Joachim Schwelien, "Bonns Schlüsselrolle", Die Zeit (March 13, 1970).

¹⁴Theo Sommer, "Ein ganz neues Bonn-Gefühl", Die Zeit (August 28, 1970).

¹⁵Stephan G. Thomas, "Ulbrichts Dilemma", Vorwärts (January 15, 1970).

¹⁶F.R. Allemann, "Entmythologisierung von Rapallo", Die Weltwoche (January 2, 1970).

¹⁷"Bonns Ostpolitik hat keine gute Presse", April 15, 1970.

¹⁸This summary of the CDU's criticism can be found in the article "Ostpolitik nur mit Bündnispartnern", Süddeutsche Zeitung, (August 28, 1970).

¹⁹These major objections of the CDU were reported in the article "Bonns Ostpolitik vor dem Europarat", Neue Züricher Zeitung (April 24, 1970).

²⁰Foreign Minister Scheel, quoted in Bulletin, January 30, 1970.

²¹"George Ball zur Bonner Ostpolitik", Neue Züricher Zeitung (December 29, 1970).

²²Heinz Barth, "Konfliktsituation mit Amerika", Die Welt (November 3, 1970).

²³As reported in the article "Washingtons Haltung gegenüber Bonns Ostpolitik", Neue Züricher Zeitung (December 23, 1970).

²⁴See "Ehmkes Blitzreise nach Washington", Neue Züricher Zeitung (December 24, 1970). Other observers derived secondary interpretations from this visit. See the New York Times, January 18, 1971 for the view that the Ehmke visit spotlighted the waning role of the Department of State in America's German policy.

²⁵Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson, "The United States and Western European Security", Department of State Bulletin (February 9, 1970), p. 157.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARD GERMAN-AMERICAN BILATERALISM

A. AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON GERMANY

The fundamental common interest of the United States and the countries of Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic, has never been simply a question of the common defence, regardless of the importance of military cooperation in the support of Europe. Instead, the common interest has been a) to maintain good bilateral relationships and b) to build an all-European order of peace by attempting to create a political arrangement encompassing all of Europe which eliminates those features of the old order which could lead to crisis or even conflict. The relationship of the United States to Europe in the immediate postwar period was a working relationship with these aims. The United States played an active and direct part in an effort to construct a new Europe. It was a time in which American foreign policy was "architectonic" and immediately involved in the shaping of the European future.

In 1970, an authoritative analysis of future possibilities for Europe wrote the epitaph for this period in American-European relations.

"The student of international affairs today faces a difficult task: to make sense and order out of a shifting kaleidoscope of economic and political impulses and restrictions, with old fears and habits mingling with new aspirations and possibilities, and a realization of the inadequacy of these post-

war institutions matching an uncertainty as to how to adapt them. In the words of T.C. Schelling, 'the time for the Grand Schemes is over.' We are moving out of our architectural period in Europe into the age of maneuver."¹

The relationship of the United States to Europe was no longer one of direct influence; Europe's future, so it was claimed, would emerge in an indirect manner. On what basis was this claim made? What was the real status of American power and influence in Europe and how had the actual relationship changed?

The determination of the actual amount of influence which the United States can bring to bear, as well as the question of how well or wisely it is being exerted, is a matter of considerable importance. However, there are two different levels at which this question can be conceptualized. A discussion of American influence must avoid one-sidedness and deal with quantitative and qualitative aspects.

1. The first level of analysis treats the question of influence in terms of the types of strength available to a country. This approach considers influence a matter of quantitative factors, such as military power, economic potential, moral authority, psychological resiliency, and legality. Briefly, these factors can be outlined individually as they relate to the question of U.S.-European relations as follows.

Military power - The stationing of American troops on the European continent has provided the Europeans with a sense of security and is a permanent lever in the relationship of the United States to the Soviet Union, albeit there is a danger that Europeans will tend to

overestimate the extent to which the United States is able to influence the Soviets.

At the same time, the use of the military factor in relations with Europe is that the presence of American forces requires a substantial underwriting of the cost of stationing by the Europeans, particularly the West Germans.²

Economic power - "By comparison with other large industrial countries, the United States Government exerts comparatively little influence over its enterprises in connection with the operation of their overseas activities."³ The problem with large scale American investment in transnational enterprises, in Europe and elsewhere, is that, from the policy planner's point of view, business is business. That is, the observable tendency in Western Europe has been for the transnational enterprises to remain supra-national in outlook. In behaving this way, large scale American investment in these enterprises has not provided the American government with additional leverage in Europe.⁴

Secondly, the economic relations between the United States and Europe have suffered because of a growing crisis in the monetary field. The maintenance of the price of gold, the skepticism of some Europeans about the idea of Special Drawing Rights, or "paper gold" from the International Monetary Fund, the American refusal to consider dollar devaluation, and the inability of the Europeans to devise, in a short space of time, a unitary monetary system have aggravated the overall economic relations between the United States

and Europe.⁵ At the same time, the United States is at logger-heads with the West Germans, whose Economics Minister, Karl Schiller, has been encouraging British entry into the Common Market. From the United States' point of view, the success of Schiller's program would be disastrous, since Britain, by joining the Common Market would infect the entire Common Market with its own 10% rate of inflation.

This potential conflict of interest between Germany and the United States was suggested in some remarks in the Senate on "The U.S. Presence in Europe".

"To be kept in mind are the negotiations in Europe regarding conditions affecting British imports of agriculture and food. The additional barriers being erected or capable of being erected by the Common Market particularly as they relate to our agricultural exports could embitter seriously the relationship between European countries in the Common Market and the United States. This is a very dangerous and serious point which I do not believe received the recognition in Europe that it should."⁶

These economic problems, combined with others, such as the lack of a coordinated policy mechanism between the United States and the European Economic Community, or the American labor opposition to liberal trade and investment policies, have become extremely serious obstacles to effective and harmonious diplomatic relations between the Americans and Europeans, and, more importantly, to maintaining the strategic balance between East and West.

Moral Authority - As the victorious side in the war against Fascism, the Allies, and particularly the United States, appeared in 1945 to be riding history's white horse. The other major power in the world, the Soviet Union, although deeply admired for its enormous efforts in the War and a source of wonder for its capacity for sacrifice, was still ruled by a despot, Stalin. The absence of any other strong democratic power made the United States the only available candidate for the position of leadership in international politics. The wartime experience of America's allies, Britain, Canada, France, had accustomed these countries to American primacy. Germany lay prostrate in Europe, its political system defeated and its leaders accused of crimes whose dimensions were beyond comprehension.

Within 25 years, there has been a sharp decline in the moral authority of the United States, a development which has several aspects.⁷ The most prominent of these at the moment has been the war in Vietnam and the widespread condemnation of American policy there. Furthermore, the rise of social unrest in the United States, while a relatively common feature of industrial society on both sides of the Atlantic, took on an added, racial, dimension which was unknown in other countries. The perception of an abatement in the Cold War and the acceptance of the Communist fact of life in Eastern Europe, while not giving a positive moral boost to the Communist system, nonetheless made its relative standing less a matter of Good and Evil in comparison with the West.

Similarly, the ability of the West German political system to carry out an orderly transfer of executive power seemed to indicate that a viable two-party system had been established, and that the overall quality of German society had improved, in a political and moral sense. Germany, although perhaps not a fully mature power, had nonetheless, recovered its good sense in addition to its economic power. The relative position of the United States to Germany, in moral terms, was no longer the simple matter it was in 1945.

Psychological resiliency - One hesitates to comment on this dimension of the relationship because, as terminology, it reflects a dimension of influence which is imprecise. In essence, the question is one of the American identity, of the American self-image and conception as a society and nation, and of the American relationship of self to power: the American will. However accidental and unintended American primacy may have been in 1945, the United States was able to make an important leap in its own status without harmful side effects. Other countries emerged from the Second World War with different changes in national quality - Britain was a vanishing empire, Germany and Japan defeated imperialisms. Only Canada, like the United States, made a qualitative leap forward into a higher order of power magnitude.

The ability to relate authentically to this new position of power made American leadership unquestioned, at home and abroad. The American sense of mission was as plain as daylight and the Europeans

stood a few respectful feet away from the sovereign psyche of Americans.

It is difficult to assess whether this psychological dimension is still intact. There is some doubt, among America's friends, that it has the necessary nerve to assume the leadership role for much longer. As a result of domestic strains which arose during the Vietnam War period, the United States has become more inward looking. Even if it has remained active in foreign policy on a global scale, it has developed a more complicated, even ambiguous, relationship to itself as a world power. The introversion of the United States is not an unreasonable mood, but it has come as a development for which other countries may not be fully ready.⁸

Legality - Because of its status as victor in the Second World War, the United States still has rights in Europe which derive automatically from the defeat of Nazi Germany. The United States has the right, for example, to stay in Berlin until a Peace Treaty is signed. The continued and strong participation of the United States in the Four Power Berlin talks indicate that the American government desires to make full use of its legal position in Germany in order to exercise influence on the course of developments there.

While it is true that because of its victor rights as well as because of Articles II and VIII in the Potsdam Protocol of Proceedings, the United States has a legitimate right to exercise influence and remain actively present in Berlin, the passage of

time has not strengthened its hand. In Berlin, as in Europe as a whole, it is unrealistic to think that American influence can again become what it was at the start of the 1960's.⁹ Instead, at this level of policy, the goal of the United States has been a conservative one, to be judicious in how existing rights are used and to retard any sudden erosion of its position. The recent Berlin agreement was calculated only as part of a gradual transition to a Germanization of German questions.

At the same time that the legal dimension of American influence in Europe is a positive one, it also contains certain paradoxical features. To begin with, the diplomacy of wartime America under President Truman has never met with the full approval of either the American diplomatic community or America's friends. George Kennan voiced his concern and said he was depressed when the communique came out of Postdam. The frivolous way in which diplomacy was conducted, Kennan felt, would be difficult to excuse.¹⁰ The United States had tied itself in a number of areas to arrangements which also gave the Soviet Union leverage. From the start of its involvement in postwar Germany, the United States was exercising influence but at the same time becoming entangled, unintentionally, in a contest with the Soviets. Nowhere was this to become more evident than in the unfolding of the future of Berlin.

Legality also meant entanglement; this was the paradox which emerged over the years. By the 1970's the problem could be formulated in a clear dichotomy. The first view of U.S. involvement in Berlin

reflected that notion that the U.S. was, as a world power, exercising legitimate influence in Europe. By keeping a foot in the door, it would also maintain a part of the strategic balance with the East. Simultaneously, however, it was possible to argue just the opposite point of view. Namely, the U.S. had permitted itself to remain entangled in a political situation which had become obsolescent and was acting on the basis of aged commitments, using a rationale which had outlived its historical usefulness. The United States had, in other words, a split personality. Sometimes it acted like the power which still wanted to be "present at the creation," and sometimes it acted like Gulliver whose troubles were apt to overwhelm it.

The United States had been able to pursue a policy of "brinkmanship" with the Soviet Union in 1961. Ten years later it was not prepared to step into another round with the Soviets in Berlin, at a time when major crises in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia were already keeping the lights burning into the small hours in Washington.

Finally, the policy of upholding the legal position of a victor in Berlin coincided with the rise of importance of successful Berlin negotiations in the policy of the Federal Republic itself. Whereas in previous years, American moves in Berlin were carried out in solitude, without any fear of interfering with German foreign policy, by the end of the 1960's and start of the 1970's autonomous foreign policy activity had developed in Bonn. This made it necessary for consultations between Bonn and Washington over the Berlin question

to take Bonn's desire for initiative into consideration. The euphoria which surrounded the initial stages of Ostpolitik also carried over into the Berlin question.

The passing of 25 years made some Americans feel that they were playing a stale role in Berlin, and many Germans felt that the time had come to begin to take matters into their own hands. This meant that what the Germans call a "Kompetenzkonflikt," a conflict of authorities threatened to arise between the U.S. and the Federal Republic. At a time when many Germans - and others as well - agreed that it was absurd for the Federal Republic to be strong economically, but weak politically, the Federal Republic was excluded from having a say in the most sensitive area of German political life.

The Opposition CDU warned the government that self-responsibility in the Berlin question was intolerable and that the Four Powers remained fully responsible.¹¹ The exercise of American influence through legal claims remained an automatic reminder for the Germans that they were still politically subordinate to the United States. In this way, instead of American influence in Berlin serving as a lever to support European security, it was a characteristic of what had become an ambiguous power relationship between Bonn and Washington.

2) Having discussed the factors of influence which the United States has had, it is useful to consider the quality of American influence.

The framework in which all of the previously discussed forms of

influence existed and still exists, is the strategic one which also involves the process of evolution of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weaponry and security systems. The nuclear revolution in warfare at first gave the United States a position of unquestioned primacy. In the first period of its relations with Europe, the position of the European states including the Soviet Union was one of inferiority. After the development of a Soviet nuclear potential, what had once been an open situation favoring the West was transformed into a closed system of nuclear-imposed restraints.

"How break out of the frozen status quo, the nuclear-imposed immobility? How get revisions? How get changes desirable changes, changes made necessary by changing conditions? Where were the substitutes for the decisive change-makers of the past - the revolutions, the civil wars, the outside interventions which frequently accompanied such upheavals, and, most important, the big international wars, many of which had entwined with revolutions and civil wars?"¹²

It was not astonishing that at the end of the Second World War, American leaders recognized the impact of warfare on the shaping and re-shaping of international politics. The wartime experience had been highly educative; syntheses of political leadership at home, diplomacy abroad, technology, economic administration and military operations were the rule rather than the exception. A mentality had arisen which saw no contradiction between politics and warfare. On the contrary, warfare was accepted as a highly desirable means of altering a political situation which the democracies found highly distasteful. The lesson which had been learned was that there was an interplay of diplomacy and the military in modern international

politics. What remained to be elaborated was a sophisticated analysis of the nature and possible forms which this interplay could have, in other words to begin a more conscious and scientific approach to what had heretofore been an unreflected fact of life.

The idea was to engage in strategic maneuvers in which this blend of diplomacy with the military would be maintained consistently.

"All these maneuvers, to be carried out successfully, required prudence, restraint, reprisals exquisitely appropriate to the prior damage, regulated dosages of destruction and pain, predetermined measures against the necessity of hasty decisions, much caution in the initiation of the use of tactical nuclear weapons before escalation into nuclear war, strong nerves, willingness to take the risks of escalation - and, above all, the ability to get to 'the other side' the actual meaning of 'the message' and to make that message credible.¹³

The relationship of the United States to Western Europe, at the level of what might be called grand influence, was based on a commitment, however, which lacked clarity in terms of political outcomes. Deterrent strategy had little to say about shaping Europe's future. Instead of being a means to achieve policy goals, "deterrence . . . is the goal of policy."¹⁴

The fact that the United States initially was able to use its military influence in the strategic realm to maintain military stability in Europe and to make credible the fact of its organic ties to Europe was no small achievement, given the extraordinary difficulties which existed at the executive level in American government. The mere stationing of troops abroad requires the constant effort of skilled administrators whose problems are far

removed from strategic issues. Given the enormous complexity within the American government of carrying out the military commitment, it may seem facile to theorize at the level of grand strategy. Nevertheless, the discussion which characterized, and still does characterize, the problems of U.S.-European security relations cannot be an administrative but a political one. The emphasis on deterrence strategy for its own sake, and on the notion of "stability", meant that American influence in Europe was politically incomplete. There was no broadly accepted concept of the manner in which military forces could be used in negotiations. The American orientation on another problem, credibility, either to the Soviets - through messages and other forms of esoteric communication - or to the Europeans whose concern was that America would not defend Europe, was an additional disorientation. This absent-mindedness permitted the question of Europe's political future to float freely, unattached to any kind of common strategy. The lessons which had been learned in the Second World War, although they made clear the fact that Americans had accepted a new quality of political imagination, remained largely academic in the European area.

The U.S. concern with maintaining the stability of Europe in terms of the military balance only coincided with half of the political interest of the Federal Republic. In the German analysis of national security policy, there are two elements which are necessary for peace-keeping, the static element of military stability and the dynamic element of a qualitative improvement of political conditions

in Central Europe. In a distillation of the overall problem, the United States' political aim was a general one, to create a European peace. The political aim of the Federal Republic has been German reunification. There has been a significant qualitative difference between American and West German strategic thought. This has not changed and will probably continue to be the most serious problem affecting relations between the United States and West Germany.

The Germans' analysis of their national security problem is that their situation is a dynamic one, constantly balancing between the ability to maintain a strong defence posture (with American troops) and their ability to reduce threats from the East. While both the United States and the Federal Republic are interested in balance, the American conception of balance means strengthening the status quo and the German conception means changing it. This does not amount to a conflict of interest between the United States and West Germany, but rather to a conflict in the quality of their European security conceptions.¹⁵ That this conflict has become more apparent could create opportunities for both East and West. The Soviet call for a European Security Conference comes at a time when there is a lack of political unity in the West over the conception of the most fundamental question which the Western countries have in common, the creation of an all-European peace order. Simultaneously, there is still a chance to engage in a discussion of the ways in which this question may be dealt with. To do this, however, requires going

beyond what is commonly known as "Alliance consultations".

What needs to be discussed is the manner in which strategic control over military forces can actualize political goals. Until then, it appears as though a no-man's land has arisen between war and peace.

"The key question for the future is not what happens during the war but what could happen without a war, in the setting of a crisis. This matter calls not for a passionate debate but for very serious and systematic examination."¹⁶

It is in this area of ambiguity that the deepest roots of European skepticism about American influence lie. The credibility of the position of the United States had rested previously on the Europeans' belief that American realpolitik had reached a level of maturity beyond their own. It had also rested on the Americans' self-assured belief that this was manifestly true. By the 1970's, neither of these principles could be accepted without reservation. The Europeans had begun to take a more objective and detached look at the United States.

B. GERMANY AND AMERIKAPOLITIK

The re-evaluation of American power is not only a hotly debated issue within the United States but has become a topic of growing interest and concern to other nations as well. For the most part, however, the discussion of this has tended to be highly subjective. What had previously been regarded as a holy omnipotence has now become transformed into an impotent degeneracy. The attitude of the Germans toward the United States at the beginning of the postwar period was that "Amerika, du hast es besser". The American occupation, compared to the Soviet, was the main yardstick

for the German people. Their knowledge of the United States was full of stereotype images; America was a Super State, a land whose contours were golden, but hazy, and whose people were generous and forgiving. There were exceptions to this appraisal, to be sure, but Germans largely thought of the United States as a model society. As one wag put it, the Germans thought that America is a place where people go after death if they have been good. The Germans and the Americans were honeymooners.

By the 1970's, although the overall balance sheet in American-German relations remained positive, a certain amount of anti-Americanism had become noticeable in the Federal Republic. Old stereotypes had been replaced with new ones. Usually, this development was glossed over by stressing the somewhat familial aspects of the relationship.

"The solid basis of mutual understanding and trust, the feeling of depending on the other person, the close personal ties which have developed in the last twenty years beyond all party ties and across the ocean should remain fast in times of crisis."

What few people seemed to notice, however, was not that there was more or less amity between Germans and Americans, but that the political relationship between the two countries had changed. The transformation of German-American relations was in fact the duality of that relationship, the growing awareness that a number of problems had arisen on a bilateral basis between the two countries, independently of the desire of either side to have friendly personal ties.

Meanwhile, the Americans had an underdeveloped notion of a German

policy because of their subsuming Germany in the deterrence framework, and the Germans had no America policy at all. Incredibly, the element of their national security policy which was at least as important as Ostpolitik, their relations with the United States, was not a political element at all, but merely a vaguely defined set of clichés. The United States had, for various reasons, been able to develop a large body of expertise for its relations with Germany, a country which it continued to regard as foreign. The Germans failed to produce, through their university system and in other ways, a reserve of specialized expertise for dealing with the United States on a bilateral basis. This lack of a rationally conceived, objective attitude toward the United States, was also a lack which could some day carry over into the Federal Republic's political relations with the United States. Inadequate understanding of the American political system and its political mentality was not just a problem for German national security experts concerned with American policy. The United States could certainly wonder whether its close ally might act irrationally toward it only because it had failed to develop a sufficiently intelligent understanding of it. In fact, developments in economic relations between the two countries were sufficient reason for strengthening sober and competent bilateral expertise, and for warding off any possibility of undue use of economic leverage at one side's expense.¹⁹

One of the primary reasons for the underdeveloped state of systematic analysis in German-American relations, and also of practical

bilateral expertise, has been the insistence, both conceptually and organizationally, on an idealistic notion of German-American alliance. Since Germany and the United States were both NATO allies, that solved all of their outstanding problems, except for the tactical resolution of such things as could be discussed, for example, in the Nuclear Planning Group. American foreign policy toward Germany has been clouded by supranationalism. For their part, the Germans have been prepared to accept supranational theory. Their conception of the NATO alliance was encouraged by their susceptibility to Hegelian idealism. In fact, the German desire to be part of a larger order is a main reason for the strategic conflict with the United States. The dynamism which requires going beyond the status quo is a logical result of a belief in a higher order of things. In contrast, American power has been pragmatic, secular and self-sufficient. For the Germans, the NATO alliance was a marriage made in heaven, not a deliberate inter-governmental relationship. Whereas the government of the Federal Republic was able to feel itself sovereign in its relations toward the East, and was able to engage in classical diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union, in its relations with the United States it acted as though diplomacy were an embarrassment and an obstacle to friendship.

Unless there is an infusion of realism in German-American relations, and a sober appraisal of the convergences and divergences between them, the existence of political problems will be obfuscated. The less attention is paid to these complicated political problems

and the less professional discussion is carried out at both the formal diplomatic level and at the informal expert level, the more slogans and ritual will come to paralyze the development of truly effective intergovernmental relations. It is difficult to agree on what amount of harmony or disharmony is "normal" in "good" interstate relations. Probably, it is no more sensible to expect "harmony" in this relationship than it is to expect a "solution" to the Berlin question. What one can strive for is the preservation of a *modus vivendi* under new conditions, regarding the relationship not so much as an ideal alliance but rather as a functioning diplomatic process.²⁰ Obviously, this understanding of the relationship is not as easy as the perception of it as alliance or partnership. It is less easy to do this because what such an analysis stresses is the duality of the relationship, not the unity. That is, it is simpler to imagine a fusion of two entities into one, than to constantly work to visualize their interrelationship as separate entities.

Naturally, it takes both sides to achieve this understanding. "It is America's right to be regarded by us as soberly as we regard the Soviet Union," wrote the late Waldemar Besson.²¹ The question, however, is not only a matter of German attitudes toward the United States. The ability of the German government to comprehend and perhaps influence the outcome of American policy and decision-making is equally important. What influence does Germany have on the United States? The factors of its influence are vastly more restricted than in the reverse case and operate in the context of

middle and great power relations. Lacking a similarly complicated and proficient power system, the Federal Republic could choose to resort to bluffing, although this would be a regrettable development. Some Germans have claimed that their Eastern policy has served to strengthen the United States' military commitment because of American concern that Germany's orientation might be shifting. But this interpretation, whether mischievous or not, is one which confuses cause and effect.

It is still true, nevertheless, that troop-stationing policy in Germany is a matter for American decision-making. The basic fact of life which the Federal Republic has to live with in this regard is that American domestic considerations place a considerable strain on the Nixon administration's efforts to maintain U.S. forces in Europe. The position of the Federal Republic is to help offset the costs of these forces, a task which the German government has fulfilled with integrity and conscientiousness. In spite of the care with which the Federal Republic has been able to carry out its obligations, the general tendency toward retrenchment in America's international role and the need for economy in defence spending have created a dynamic which will probably lead to a certain reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. "The arguments for large scale U.S. troop reduction in the U.S. Congress - where the issue may well be settled - revolve around the disposition of limited U.S. resources. . . . At a time of inflation, unemployment and large continuing balance of payments deficits, it is not surprising that Congressmen question the

appropriateness of continuing large scale U.S. expenditures and concentration of U.S. efforts in Europe which contribute about an additional 1 billion dollars to the U.S. balance of payments deficit."²² Unfortunately, the impact of even a slight American readjustment on the Federal Republic is felt in greatly enlarged measure by the Germans; the insensitivity of a superpower and the oversensitivity of a middle power are the correlates of this uncoordinated decision-making system.

Under the conditions of an impending American reduction of forces, the Germans and others have been pressing, in the NATO forum, for the policy of mutual and balanced force reductions between the two alliance systems. MBFR has become a current focus of discussion in the dialogue between the American and West German defense departments. A number of problems have emerged in the course of this discussion and a great deal of energy has been expended in these extremely difficult issues. For example, the tactical question of whether or not MBFR should or should not be linked to a Berlin settlement has been hotly contended. In addition, a large amount of time has been spent on the structure which a balanced reduction ought to assume. Ideally, a balanced reduction of forces, from the German standpoint would presumably have to include the Soviets' Medium Range Ballistic Missiles which are stationed in Eastern Europe, and also an effective reduction of forces in the Soviets' Mediterranean Fleet. These are some of the issues which have arisen in the MBFR discussion. However, these are, for the Germans, also issues which

affect the political structure in Europe. The Federal Republic would like to be able to think of MBFR as a lever which the West is still able to exert on the East.

It is debatable whether the bargaining position of the West is sufficiently strong. Since the alternative to MBFR would be unilateral American reductions, the West actually is compelled to adopt the MBFR idea in order to forestall a completely intolerable event, a unilateral American reduction. Such a move would probably create enormous psychological difficulties for the Europeans. Thus it is probably not astonishing that the Soviets indicated their acceptance of the MBFR proposal in the Tiflis speech by Brezhnev.

Both choices are bad from the West's standpoint. If forces are withdrawn unilaterally, the result would be psychologically disastrous. But to withdraw them in the context of an inter-alliance deal would mean giving the Russians a foothold, at the very least, in the procedure for withdrawal. This would hardly be a short-cut to the realization of Germany's strategic wishes. But this situation has other, political, ramifications.

As was pointed out in the discussion of Ostpolitik, the absence of a firmly developed bilateral U.S.-German relationship and the routinization of German-American diplomacy in political clichés and organizational ritual has meant that both countries have been unintentionally entangling themselves against their better interests. Those people whose task is to improve relations within the given bilateral channels seem unable to prevent this gradual descent into a morass. The hidden political crisis in German-American

relations is the deflection of their national diplomatic resources and the elevation of the most paradoxical elements of their policies to positions of primacy in the diplomacy of the NATO alliance. The Eastern policy of the Federal Republic, rather than being the alleviation of the American burden of detente-seeking, has taken on aspects of a vastly different nature. It appears that Germany has stepped down a path which will lead it, not out of the woods, but into a period of protracted entanglement in the East. Rather than acting to help the United States find a secure fall-back position, Germany is doing just the opposite. For its part, the United States' role as guarantor of the Western "pillar" of Germany's defense position is in doubt. Acting to alleviate Germany's burden by supporting MBFR, the United States also has opened itself up to becoming too entangled in the details of balanced force reductions to be able to provide any political leverage for Germany. Both sides have become entangled in each others' weaknesses and the foundations have been laid for a far more frustrating situation than found in any previous "Kompetenzkonflikt" between the two sides. The danger is that the relationship will soon take on the character of an "Impotenzkonflikt" instead.

Obviously, neither side has intended things to work out this way. If this situation is pointed out, it will be denied and statements will be made to the effect that things have never been better.²³ Earlier, it was the Germans who were in constant need of reassurance - they would come to Washington for what Secretary Rusk called "pledging

sessions." More recently, there is more mutuality in this kind of behavior, with the Germans needing to reassure Washington that they are aware of the limitations of the Eastern policy. Neither side seems able to disentangle itself from the other. The problem at hand is how to improve the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Federal Republic. They have tended to a) take their relationship for granted, b) neglect to coordinate their approaches to the East, and c) focus too little attention on the emergence of strictly inter-state problems. A strategy crisis has arisen.

FOOTNOTES

¹Alastair Buchan (ed.), Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 158.

²Josef Joffe, "Amerikanische Präsenz und Europäische Stabilität", Europa Archiv, Vol. 25, No. 6 (March 25, 1970). See the bibliography for a detailed list of materials which deal with American troop-stationing policy.

³Raymond Vernon, "Multinational Enterprises and National Security", Adelphi Papers, No. 74 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 13. Also Jack N. Behrman, National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

⁴Because multinational corporations are seeking to transcend the nation-state, the conclusion has been drawn that the nation-state is an ineffective and outmoded political structure. For example, see Richard J. Barnet, "Farewell to the Nation-State", The New York Times, June 19, 1971.

⁵Although it is still too early to give a full assessment of these trends, some interesting observations can be found in the article "Europe and America: the way to a break-up", Vision [The European Business Magazine], No. 1 (November 1970). Background to this can be found in Alfred E. Davidson, "Correcting the Imbalance in U.S. International Payments", Orbis, Vol. X, No. 1 (Spring, 1966), pp. 213-222, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Future of Atlantic Economic Relationships", Orbis, Vol. X, No. 2 (Summer, 1966), pp. 408-437, and William Diebold, Jr., "Europa und die Vereinigten Staaten: Perspektiven der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen", Europa Archiv, Vol. 25, No. 15/16 (August 1970), pp. 597-608.

⁶In the Congressional Record - Senate, Vol. 116, No. 191, December 1, 1970, p.S 19095.

⁷Dean Acheson calls prestige "the shadow cast by power". In Present at the Creation, op. cit., p. 405.

⁸American allies have been paying close attention to this phenomenon. See Peter Wiles, "The Declining Self-Confidence of the Super-Powers", International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 1971), pp. 289-301.

⁹Two studies which examine the Berlin question in that period are Alois Riklin, Das Berlinproblem (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1964) and Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

¹⁰George F. Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 258-259. The standard American work on this subject is Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace; the Potsdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). For German views see Ernst Deuerlein et al., Potsdam und die deutsche Frage (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970) and Jens Hacker, Sowjetunion und DDR zum Potsdamer Abkommen (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft, 1968).

¹¹"Opposition warnt Regierung vor Selbstverantwortung für Berlin", Die Welt (November 3, 1970).

¹²William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 480.

¹³Carleton, op. cit., pp. 480-481.

¹⁴James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance; The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 139.

¹⁵A lucid exposition of German security policy may be found in Klaus Ritter, "Europäische Friedensordnung als Entwicklungsproblem der weltpolitischen Infrastruktur", Europa Archiv, Vol.25, No. 15/16 (August, 1970), pp. 541-558.

¹⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, "New Nuclear Ideas", Newsweek (June 7, 1971).

¹⁷For a good study of the occupation, see John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

¹⁸Hartmut Schulze-Boysen, "Deutschland-Amerika in den siebziger Jahren," Der Monat, No. 256 (January, 1970), p. 82.

¹⁹A snapshot of German diplomacy in Washington is presented in the article "Wo Kiesinger noch 'Herr Bundeskanzler' ist", Der Spiegel (August 2, 1971).

²⁰An attempt to develop a systematic analysis of alliance harmony and disharmony may be found in Roger Morgan, "Washington and Bonn: A Case Study in Alliance Politics", International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 1971), pp. 489-502.

²¹"Europe Needs America More Than Ever", reprinted from Die Politische Meinung, The German Tribune Quarterly Review, No. 14, (April 29, 1971).

²²John W. Tuthill, "Strategy Drift in the Atlantic", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1971), p. 161.

²³For an optimistic analysis of German-American relations see Klaus Schoenthal, "Bonn-Washington: The Maturing Alliance", Aussenpolitik (English Edition), Vol. 21, No. 1 (1970). Schoenthal argues that alliance maturity will be tested in the debate about North Atlantic defense cost sharing. Although it is likely that both sides can weather more rounds of such talks, it seems unlikely that they will result in incrementally stronger German-American relations.

CHAPTER V

THE STRATEGY CRISIS

A. THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

"The essential reason why the Bonn/Washington relationship was less close during the 1960's is that the respective perceptions of the Soviet threat have diverged; this fundamental factor, much more than shifting perceptions and priorities at other levels of political action, is the key to understanding the changing nature of the relationship between the two allies."

Roger Morgan

American civilian strategists drew various conclusions from the experience of the Second World War. They came to assume as a general principle that appeasement of aggression only leads to more aggression. They also realized that postwar American leadership ought to be able to develop a unity between foreign and military policy.

"The major American contributions to strategic thinking published in 1956-67 were distinguished by two main characteristics. They attempted to reintegrate military power with foreign policy, stressing, in contradiction to the doctrine of massive retaliation, the need for a 'strategy of options'. And they tended to be the work of academic institutions; Kaufmann's group at Princeton, Osgood from Chicago, Kissinger working with the Council on Foreign Relations. . . . the strategy of options which they urged had as its object, not the reduction of tensions, but the provision of additional and appropriate weapons to deal with a subtle adversary who might otherwise get under the American guard."¹

During this time, the most articulate theoretician on the subject of the need for a military-political synthesis was Henry Kissinger. His deliberations were based firstly on the need to develop such a synthesis because American power had been previously weakened through the military-political dichotomy, and secondly because he recognized the general need to counter the Soviet threat. Kissinger maintained that the United States faced a power which incorporated Clausewitz' doctrines into the highest echelons of statecraft. To survive in such an environment, and to meet this threat, it would be necessary to develop a similar hybrid mentality.

"Effective action against the Soviet threat, therefore, presupposes a realization that the contest with the Soviet bloc is likely to be protracted, a fact from which we cannot escape because the Soviet leaders insist on it. Both in our diplomacy and in our military policy we must be able to gear firmness to patience and not be misled by Soviet maneuvers or by our preference for absolute solutions. . . . Everything depends, therefore, on our ability to graduate our actions both in our diplomacy and in our military policy."²

Elsewhere in the same study, Kissinger made even clearer his belief that national leadership must become Clausewitzian.

"The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is to reintroduce the political element into our concept of warfare and to discard the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war can have goals distinct from those of national policy.³ [The strategy of limited war] requires strong nerves. We can make a strategy of limited war stick only if we leave no doubt about our readiness and our ability to face a final showdown. Its effectiveness will depend on our willingness to face up to the risks of Armageddon."⁴

The international system, viewed as a protracted conflict, or as what one analyst has called "the struggle for world-strategic decisions"⁵ imposed on the West the need to develop an instrumental view of warfare. In this analysis, the most challenging aspect of Communism is its theoretical emphasis on the relationship between war and peace as instruments for carrying out the class struggle with the West. War, instead of being an uncontrollable monster unleashed upon the world, should become, so the Communists hoped, "a light handy weapon which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries."⁶ To respond to this kind of challenge, the leadership of the West would have to adopt a similarly instrumental view of warfare and overcome its built-in inhibitions. Specifically, strategic leadership would have to combine a willingness to engage in limited war on the one hand with steadiness and confidence on the other. "There is a fundamental difference between leading an alliance and engaging in a permanent seminar about the latest fashionable strategic theories."⁷ And,

"Our feeling of guilt with respect to power has caused us to transform all wars into crusades, and then to apply our power in the most absolute terms. We have rarely found intermediary ways to use our power and in those cases we have done so reluctantly."⁸

The United States, having inherited the central leadership position in the West, had undertaken to become as good and wise a leader as possible. It strove to employ its power in such a manner that it would be both effective towards its main adversary, the Soviet Union, and credible in its wisdom to its friends. The acceptance

of the wisdom of American leadership was an important intangible in the West's position. This was the case not only because the United States was a superpower with nuclear weapons, but also because its power existed at other levels. It could champion the security interests of other nations as well in their own desire to preserve their identities and freedoms. The burdens this placed on the leadership of the United States were obvious. It was necessary to become a leader with two qualities, firmness of will and sophistication of power. What cemented the position of American political leadership to American allies was the resoluteness of the United States combined with their understanding of American strategic doctrine. If either one should fail the only result could be the strategic disorientation of the West.

The "imperial nerve" of the United States was of a piece with the Americanized version of Clausewitz: the strategy of controlled escalation.

"Controlled escalation is a strategy developed principally to apply to direct or indirect confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It envisages influencing the adversary's will to fight and his willingness to settle a conflict by means of a process of 'bargaining' during a 'competition in risk-taking' on ascending - and, hopefully, on the lower - levels of violence, which would culminate in a mutually unacceptable nuclear war at the top of the escalation ladders."⁹

The American experience in Southeast Asia has generated considerable discussion about the feasibility of limited warfare strategy. This discussion has centered either on the possibility

of perfecting limited-war theory or on the means by which the instrument was used, whether or not controlled escalation was properly applied in Vietnam.

The focus of the discussion is found either in the technicalities of escalation or in the realm of the theory of limited warfare. The problem which emerged, however, in the Vietnam experience, was that the logic contained in the equation of resoluteness with controlled military power, however brilliant on its own terms, operated within the larger, open, uncontrolled, evolutionary dynamic of the conflict itself. The evolution of the game itself produced a logic which made the application of prior theory turn out to be illogical. The resoluteness-limited warfare equation was too self-contained to be able to be called a strategy.

"One has the feeling, which may not spring entirely from a lack of imagination, that in the nature of international conflict and technology in the latter half of the twentieth century there are only a limited number of basic strategic ideas pertaining to limited war, and that we have seen most of these emerge in the remarkable strategic renaissance of the past decade or so. These ideas can be combined in countless permutation and combinations and implemented by a great variety of means, but we shall still recognize trip-wires, pauses, reprisals, denials, thresholds, sanctuaries, bargaining, demonstrations, escalation, Mao's three stages, enclaves, seize-and-hold, search-and-destroy, and all the rest."¹⁰

The limitations of limited war strategy were based on the limitations of what were perceived as the fundamental requirements needed for the exercise of wise national leadership. The lesson which had been learned, had been learned well. However, there were new

lessons to be learned.

"Perhaps the most significant conclusion . . . is to the extent to which the quality of strategic thinking in the nuclear age is related to an understanding of international relations."¹¹ Without an appreciation of the way in which policy operations could suddenly become counterproductive, strategy would remain abstract. Strategy would need to develop an awareness of its historical setting. Although it is true that "the crucial test of our strategic doctrine is . . . what it defines as a threat," the leadership of the West interpreted the Soviet threat in such a way that strategy oriented itself toward the development of a counter-Clausewitzian personality, not on the political evolution of the Soviet-American confrontation.

B. NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION'S WESTPOLITIK

"The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is constantly changing, yet remains the same . . . tough postures have been gradually replaced by subtler diplomacy.

Dev Murarka

It is not fashionable to speak about a confrontation between East and West. The term "Cold Warrior" has entered into the vocabulary of the 1970's as a pejorative one.

"Partly as a consequence of the strategic stabilization the conflict relationship between the Soviet Union and the West has passed from a stark postwar confrontation to a more ambiguous stage in which the balance of conflicting and parallel interests is less clearly defined, and the conflict itself has a more diffuse character."¹²

anti-Communism is considered gauche, and a view of a Soviet-Western conflict of interest is considered oversimplified international relations. As a result, a curious state of affairs has come into being. Although significant military trends are developing in favor of the Soviet Union, many Western analysts during this same period have become almost dogmatic in their contention that the Soviet threat has diminished.¹³

"For the present, Soviet diplomacy toward the West is a holding action. It operates under restraints that reflect a preoccupation with serious domestic problems and an awareness of the limitations of the present Soviet strategic position. It appears to desire nothing more than to have the West hold quiet for a while so that it will not be distracted from the priority tasks of repairing structural deficiencies in the Soviet economy and divisions within the Communist bloc."¹⁴

Correspondingly, recent events within the Eastern bloc, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the crisis in Poland in 1970, and the continuing acrimony between the Soviet Union and China are unquestionably illustrative of problems within the Communist world and of internal weaknesses which could cancel out foreign policy gains.

The "Cold War" has come to mean an obsolescent period in relations between the West and the Soviet Union characterized by the following:

- a) The dominating fact of international politics was a conflict of purposes between the two;
- b) An oversimplified, and often hysterical perception of the other side created stereotypes whose highly charged emotionality

helped fuel the conflict;

c) The Soviet Union was ideologically militant, nationally expansive and faced a disordered world.¹⁵

By these standards, for there to have been a change away from the Cold War, it is necessary to show:

a) An ambiguity of purpose between the Soviet Union and the West;

b) a matured view of the other side;

c) an ideologically passive, nationally dormant Soviet Union in an ordered world.

It is true that the years have brought a greater sophistication to the perceptions which both sides have of each other, have instilled a mutual respect for the potential of nuclear weaponry, and have given little credence to the idea that the Soviet Union is poised to attack, sending hordes of troops into Western Europe. Nevertheless, an unavoidable fact of international life, as the 1970's unfold, is the continued expansion of Soviet power and influence in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa.

The issue is not whether there are domestic constraints on Soviet and Eastern European foreign policy. There are. It is not whether we can understand the Soviets better than we used to. We can. Stereotypes can be overcome, internal weaknesses in the Soviet system can be understood as reasons for the Soviet Union's foreign intransigence. What still remains, for whatever justification one may care to find, is the naked fact of a power struggle between two different political systems. Therefore, a realistic view of

European security questions, which also involve the United States and Canada, is that they are part of a political contest. For this reason it is also necessary to affirm that the word "detente" cannot mean, for any serious analyst, a euphoric sense of relaxation and the belief that the Soviet Union is about to be transformed into a passive state. The Soviets themselves boast incessantly about their strength; the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution was a paean to Soviet power.¹⁶

The development of the Soviet Union as a maritime and naval force, its strength in the field of strategic weaponry and, more ominously, its probable rise as a power capable of fielding conventional mobile forces, is a phenomenon which has nothing to do with whether or not one is a "Cold Warrior". It is the Soviet Union and its allies who are operating this military complex, not the Western allies. The apparent ambiguities which surround the Soviet-Western relationship derive from the asymmetrical qualities and interactions of the Soviet and Western operations as they are understood in the West.

The idea that, in spite of the growth of Soviet military power, the Soviet threat is diminishing is a paradox. This has led to a reexamination of the underlying conceptualization used in Western thinking, and of its shortcomings both in political and analytic aspects.

German strategic thought argues that previous evaluations of the Soviet threat have tended to deal with the given potential and the

given situation; threat = potential + intention. In the German view, an analysis of the possible political-strategic effects of the Soviet potential requires an interpretive understanding of both:

- a) The political complex which led to the development of the potential and
- b) the indirect effects which the mere presence of the potential has on Western perceptions. In other words, threat analysis must have historical and psychological dimensions.¹⁷

What is noteworthy is that the problem does not exhaust itself simply in this theoretical realm, with a criticism of earlier analytic modes as too narrow. This deficiency and the predominance of this view must be seen as an integral part of the United States' general disposition toward status quo policy. Before exploring the limitations of such a policy, however, the theoretical task must be made clear. It will be essential in the years ahead to devise a methodological approach to security policy analysis and political discussion which is comprehensive enough to include the following analytic criteria:

- a) The dynamics in the development of the strategic relationship, instead of a comparison of forces in a certain situation.
- b) The interrelationship of strategic policy with other components of foreign and security policy in regard to certain political goals, instead of an essentially isolated policy of deterrence.
- c) The fundamental political-strategic asymmetries in the American-Soviet relationship, instead of a notion of stability

based on the parallel behavior of both sides.¹⁸

German criticism of military strategy, especially nuclear strategy, in NATO - and particularly in the United States - is that it has had a single political purpose in relation to the Soviet Union: deterrence. Although moderately easy to comprehend, as strategic doctrine, this has been a relatively isolated and abstract political goal, corresponding to status-quo political thought. Deterrence doctrine has not been an organic part of a general Western policy toward the U.S.S.R. At the same time, nuclear power was transformed from a potential instrument of international relations into a mystified institution. Nuclear power gradually became transformed into a decisive structural feature of the international system. The formula of bipolarity, instead of being part of operational policy, existed for its own sake, as a fixed point. Once again, navigation had become disoriented.

To be sure, there are understandable reasons for this transformation of strategy and its disorientation. In the decade which ended in 1965, the question of nuclear power was framed in a way which centered, unavoidably, on problems of the structure of the Atlantic system. For one thing, the United States' drive to assert central control raised the issue of its position within the Alliance system. At the same time, there were Western European - largely French - efforts to achieve political equality. The disorientation of Western strategy was what might almost be called a "passing phase" in the political evolution of Western Europe. From the end of the

1950's through the early 1960's, because the Western powers were preoccupied with the problem of how they would work together under the extreme conditions of nuclear warfare, they attempted to structure their political relations according to this problem.¹⁹

"Without a central authority capable of making rapid decisions Europe could not act effectively in crisis or war. The coordination of policies of separate governments each exercising a veto would prevent the swift response required by such situations: the deterrent value of any European nuclear force controlled in this way would be correspondingly low. It follows that during the transition period before a European government comes into being, the more exposed European states will realize the advantages of protection by a strong nuclear ally capable of the necessary prompt response."²⁰

In retrospect it is possible to draw several conclusions from the experiences of this period. To begin with, there were really very few possibilities for the development of a Western European structure. Most prominently, the French departure from the NATO integrated command reflected the lack of agreement in nuclear questions.²¹ Secondly, the United States' goal of preserving central control over nuclear strategy missed the mark.

Keeping all this in mind there are some important conclusions to be drawn. The concentration of alliance debate on structural questions was an example of strategic disorientation. It handicapped not only the political development but also the security of Western Europe. Of course the argument can be made that this situation was caused primarily by inner-Western developments, such as the French

opposition to American primacy, or the rather complicated relations between Bonn and Paris. These inner-Western developments had their own legitimacy, as political issues. Nevertheless, in these years which were decisive ones for Europe, the countries of the Western alliance were led into being guided by a security idea which, unlike Soviet thinking, was static, rather than dynamic.

"NATO," it has been said, "since it was designed to deal with the immediate and specific threat of a Soviet attack, will retain its vitality as long as its member nations discern the reality of the threat and are agreed upon the means to be chosen in response to an attack."²² Since the nature of the Soviet threat was perceived in a static way, NATO's response, deterrence strategy, led it into the impasse of the structural debate. The emphasis on the complex problem of nuclear control could not have taken place without the doctrine of deterrence as a precondition.

If the actual threat from the Soviet Union was not attack, in the sense of a single offensive blow, but rather a process of concerted pressure and regulated dosage of political leverage, then NATO's "vitality" rested on a perception of a threat which would never come into being. This was the hidden problem in the crisis which most observers discerned in the Atlantic Alliance, a crisis which gave Soviet policy the chance of slowly changing the old system of a diplomatic stand-off which had arisen in Europe in the 1950's to its own advantage and of gaining influence on the development of the political structure of Western Europe. The

structural crisis within the Atlantic Alliance had essentially autonomous causes within the West. However, after the question of the American nuclear guarantee - and whether that guarantee should be augmented by a Western European deterrent - had been incorporated into the structural crisis, the Soviet Union was provided with a tailor-made opportunity to exert leverage. There were two ways in which this could be done.

"The first way in which Moscow could use its diplomacy was in the field of non-proliferation policy. The debate within NATO over questions of nuclear control meant that the Soviet Union could exacerbate already existing tensions within the Western Alliance. It could increase the interest of the United States in centralized control, since this interest existed already. Conversely, it was given the opportunity of weakening any desires or impulses which existed for the construction of a strong strategic potential in Western Europe."²³ By doing this, it could generate conflicts among the Atlantic allies centered on their goals. This meant being able to carry out a policy of "divide and divide", even if not "divide and conquer". Naturally, the question of the Western European deterrent could not be raised independently of the question of West German control over or participation in nuclear weaponry and this was an issue which, *sui generis*, provided the Soviets with an extra nuance in their diplomacy. NATO's strategic disorientation and the ensuing controversy gave the Soviet Union the opportunity of directly influencing Western nuclear policy. This was "interdependence" with a vengeance.

There was a second way in which the Soviet Union's diplomacy entered into the picture. The field of military strategy and the question of the relationship of forces in the Atlantic area was as much an opportunity for Moscow as was Western non-proliferation policy. Since the Western alliance was already deeply immersed in the nuclear control issue, it was understandable that additional military options, other than the nuclear one, would come to the fore. Viewing this, Moscow tried, in addition to splitting the West on the issue of nuclear control, to deny NATO any further strategic options, i.e. the conventional one. And, as in its activity in the non-proliferation policy issue, Moscow's propaganda activities could attempt to weaken the cohesiveness of an Atlantic Alliance whose rationale was based on the United States nuclear guarantee. Most important, as will be explained, was the opportunity of choking off any Western European initiatives aimed at bringing about a Western European deterrent which was no longer plugged into the American strategic potential.²⁴

"The Soviets have developed a body of strategic thought that is far richer in content and far more responsive to the requirements of modern conflict than any doctrinal thinking in the Free World. At the risk of oversimplification, it may be suggested that the United States, at best, has only a military doctrine and lacks a counterpart to the Soviet doctrine of conflict as an organic whole. American doctrinal thinking is linear, while Soviet conflict thinking is dialectic. Our doctrine is highly abstract, while the Soviets combine abstractness with concreteness. Where we tend to ignore historical experiences and to reason in a narrow time span, the Soviets make a major effort to master historical depth."²⁵

The asymmetry of strategic doctrines, as applied to European security policy resulted not only from the disposition toward a status quo in general, nor from the objective situation. It resulted because of the differences in political intent. Moscow's opening to the West resulted from the basic asymmetry in its relationship with the West: it did not have to contend with an opposing political strategy. What mattered in this case was not whether the Soviet leadership was brilliant. The point is not that one may either underrate or overrate the skill of the Soviets, but simply that they were able to operate in the completely uncontested dimension of offensive diplomatic activity.

To illustrate the ironical state of affairs which had come about in the relationship of NATO to the East, it is useful to point out that there were - and still are - fundamental qualitative differences between what the Soviet Union and the West consider to be reasonable European security systems.

Any debate about deterrence, or the discussion about nuclear control and the non-proliferation controversy, while highlighting the valuable truth that there can be strength through diversity in the West, also assumed that inner-Western controversy could be carried out from a fundamental position of strength, since Western security policy thought was assumed to be universally valid. The confidence of the West was derived from its assumptions about its own rationality, from the belief that, no matter how controversial, security policy thinking in the West was more sophisticated than

Soviet security policy thinking. The differences between the two, while recognized as existing, were largely explained as doctrinal, rather than operational, in nature. But it was precisely in the area of diplomacy that the real contest was conducted. This is the perception of the Soviet threat which characterizes German strategic thought.

"The chief security problem for the Soviet Union, which is to say the perception of threat as seen from Moscow, presumably could be found in the belief that a regional conflict in Europe could not be controlled. On the contrary, instead of controlled-response or limited conflict, such a conflict would escalate and in the course of its escalation the strategic potential of the United States would be employed. Central Europe, which meant Germany, was the area which would probably be the theater of escalation and it was therefore appropriate, in the logic of Soviet security policy, to isolate the political question of Germany, and at the same time, to weaken all mechanisms in the Western alliance which would raise the risk of escalation. In other words, the chief security problem which occupied the Soviet Union was not the large-scale military presence of the United States in Western Europe, but rather the coupling of the superior American destructive potential with the Western European defence system. But it was precisely this coupling which was the basis of Western European security."²⁶

Since the beginning of the 1960's, a great deal of thought was given to this nerve center of the Western alliance and there

were intensive efforts made to assure that the American strategic potential would be linked to the Western European defense system. There were several ways in which planners attempted to construct such a linkage. First, the doctrine of flexible response was introduced at the strategic level of discussion. The doctrine of flexible response materialized, secondly, in the way in which forces were planned, specifically by the development of a conventional option for NATO. Third, there was an increase in the planned or institutionalized interlocking of the American potential with NATO, in the nuclear area, a tendency which found its expression in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Last, the conventional option was realized by the proposed creation of strategic forces for the protection of Western Europe. These strategic forces were of two varieties, the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF), and national nuclear forces.

These developments in the political thinking and defense planning of the Western alliance were motivated by a belief that a counterpoise to the Soviet Union would require the attainment of a credible threat of escalation. This goal, incidentally, was forced to coexist with the structural crisis problems of the Western alliance.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the Soviets took this threat seriously. "On the basis of their assessment of the new situation, American political and military leaders began to consider the so-called strategy of 'flexible response' more acceptable and expedient. In their opinion, this would permit the conduct of

either general nuclear war of limited wars, with or without nuclear weapons.

"The strategy of 'flexible response' was formulated by General Taylor in the book mentioned above, The Uncertain Trumpet, where he reveals the essence of this strategy and the mode of its conduct:

"The strategic doctrine, which I would propose to replace massive retaliation, is called herein the Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything . . .

"In other words, the strategy proposed by Taylor is suitable, in his opinion, for all contingencies and provides an answer to any situation."²⁷

The credibility of the American posture was also evident in the Soviet assessment, although couched in the normal jargon.

"The admission of the possibility that they might conduct a nuclear war, despite its unlikelihood, proves that the American imperialists are ready to embark upon any monstrous crimes against mankind to prevent their own inevitable destruction. Such a war would be an extreme measure; it might be initiated by the aggressors when all other measures had failed to give tangible results in the struggle with the socialist camp."²⁸

The Soviets were convinced of the credibility of the new strategic posture of the Western alliance. However, this new attempt, to develop a more credible threat of escalation based on the principle of flexible response, also required a parallel in the overall quality of Western and Soviet strategic thought and in the behavior of the two sides. The rationality of the Western alliance's

strategic conceptions depended, in other words, not on whether the Soviet Union believed in the West's determination and organizational competence. Only in the event that there was corresponding Soviet diplomatic behavior, in the area of security policy, could the Western strategic conceptions leave the realm of theoretical discourse and enter into the real world of diplomacy. The rationality and effectiveness of the conventional option, for example, would depend not on whether the Soviets feared the use of this instrument, but on their behavior as the nuclear threshold was approached. Similarly, the Western "option" of a counterforce strategy, on which the Minuteman program was based, would be reasonable only if the Soviet side saved cities as strategic goals.

The belief in the inherent rationality of Western doctrine and its subsequent superiority had another peculiar aspect. The so-called "strategic dialogue" between the two major world powers was characterised by the following premise. The United States believed that there was a "doctrinal lag" which the Soviet side would have to overcome.²⁹ The fact that the Soviets felt the Western doctrine was credible, however, was interpreted in the West as an indication that the Soviets had finally caught up to the West and had finally learned the rules of stability which the Americans had discovered.

It is worth citing examples of how Western thinkers have expounded this belief in the self-evident nature of the rationality of security policy as developed in the West.

"The task of the non-Communist world is not to worry itself sick over the ultimate goals of the Soviet leadership or the degree of its sincerity, but to concentrate on multiplying situations in which the Soviet Union either will be forced or will choose to play the game of international politics in an essentially traditional setting. How the Kremlin leaders will square this with their Marxist conscience is not really our concern."³⁰

Or as a noted analyst of Soviet Affairs wrote,

"When it comes to Soviet foreign policy, however, we can be frank to acknowledge our desire to encourage its evolution. The metamorphosis that has been described in the Soviet conception of its revolutionary aims represents in effect a process of attenuation of the revolutionary ideology which has been in many ways a major source of conflict in this relationship. We should therefore wish to encourage a further evolution in this direction, to the point where Soviet policy genuinely accepts the existence of a variety of forms of society in the world which need not be inherently hostile to each other. This need not mean the abandonment of Soviet ideas about the direction of historical change, whether Marxist or otherwise, within the framework of a mutual acceptance of an historical wager, as long as the Soviet leadership comes to recognize a self-interest in accepting orderly and non-violent processes of change. It is not our purpose to defend the status quo, which would in any case be an impossible task, but it is our purpose to draw the Soviet Union further toward the acceptance of international processes that make possible adjustments without war."³¹

The problem, however, may be just the opposite. If the Soviet Union were unable to play anything else except a game of international politics in an essentially traditional manner, the dilemma in European security policy might become more understandable. If one

were to imagine a world in which the evolution of international relations theory had remained fixated in just such a classical, traditional period, such a world could easily take the form of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. As pointed out earlier, the Soviets' perceived willingness to incorporate Clausewitzian thought into the highest levels of governmental operations, was regarded in the West as a Soviet strength. However, such thought is not necessarily an indication of Soviet genius and superiority. There are always those who attribute, almost masochistically, subtlety and sophistication to the Soviets and denseness and heavy-handedness to the West. This misses the point. The strength of the Soviet Union in its political relationship with the West is an asymmetrical one: it has become a specialist in classical diplomacy at a time when the West has been thoroughly restless and innovative in its attempts to go beyond "old-fashioned" diplomacy. The drive for modernization in the West, its most distinguishing and attractive feature, has at the same time, paradoxically, contributed most to its own frustration in dealing with the Communist world. The West, as if looking at the threat from the Communist system through a glass obliquely, if not darkly, has opposed Soviet traditionalism with modernism. Kissinger is right in saying that alliance leadership requires steadiness, but it is the steadiness which should come from deepening and refining classical interstate diplomacy, not because steadiness is always a virtue in itself.

The United States as the first society to experience the future must make a conscious effort to cope with the fact that its major

political rival is living in a different century. Perhaps, therefore, the solution to this problem - if indeed there is such a thing as a solution - does not exist in the development of ultra-modern and sophisticated theories and practices of diplomacy, systems analysis and other recent practices, but in the development of a body of Western expertise in classical power politics. If this were possible, such an approach could augment the use of alliances as instrumental entanglements and of limited war as an instrument of diplomacy, rather than as institutionalized entrapments. This could become the essence of the Western strategic approach, the understanding that an opponent who thinks in the tradition of past, classical diplomacy deserves to be met on his own terms. At least it is now possible to recognize the dilemma that there have been dynamic forces, inherent in Western development, which have made the understanding of this political problem extremely difficult. The rapid growth of the West has not encouraged diplomatic thought to remain frozen in 19th century schools. The deep-seated reasons that the West has striven, in its relationship with the Soviet Union, for a policy of stability whose rationality depended on the behavior of the other side, lie perhaps in the fact that the Western notion of rationality in security policy was conceived in a different century, in a different world altogether. In Europe, if Moscow would have supported the coupling of the American strategic potential to the Western European defense system, it would have had to accept rules of security policy rationality which it was constitutionally

incapable of doing. To put it another way, it would have accepted precisely that which it regarded, on its own terms, as the most sensitive factor in its own insecurity. Therefore, it is hardly astonishing that the Soviet Union's security policy was, in Western eyes, a completely "irrational" form of behavior. After all, the Soviet Union did just enough to undercut the West's desired strategic options.

a) The Western doctrine of flexible response encountered the Soviet doctrine of automatic escalation. Accordingly, there could not be such a thing as "controlled response" but only a global conflict, all-out war.

b) NATO's hopes of building a conventional option corresponded to the Soviet Union's demobilization program which eliminated 1,200,000 men and, moreover, equipped the Warsaw Pact forces with nuclear delivery devices.

c) The Western attempts to provide a strategic potential for the protection of Western Europe were offset by the construction of a Medium-range Ballistic Missile system (MRBM) in Eastern Europe. This could hardly be matched by a sufficiently effective potential on the Western side, and its existence is still potentially controversial, especially at a time when mutual and balance force reductions are being considered in Europe.³²

This strategic situation can be considered as a whole period of interaction in the relations between East and West in Europe. The qualitative differences in the respective security policies

can be readily understood. So can the real nature of the Soviet threat, namely its diplomatic offensive capability. The Soviet Union did not accept the West's security proposal, nor did it subscribe to Western rationality. It did not believe that the creation of a stabilized deterrent in which the American strategic potential was joined to Europe was good security policy. And, since it did not behave "rationally", the whole idea of a stabilized deterrent was impossible.

Instead, the Soviet Union's idea of a good security system was one which weakened the threat of escalation from the West, gave Moscow a larger amount of room to maneuver in European controversies even though it was still in second place in the strategic weapons competition with the United States, and denied NATO its desired strategic options.

Soviet strategy was not concerned exclusively with offsetting the position and development of Western security systems. The fact is that the Soviets were at all times keeping their eye on the prize of becoming the determining diplomatic force on the European continent, the author and originator of European security policy. The competition with Washington was political and the stakes were high. The strategic interest of the Soviets primarily concerned decoupling the American strategic potential, but not necessarily the American presence in Europe. The political aims of the Soviets went considerably further. This insight is particularly relevant at a time when the Soviets are attempting to bring into being a

"European Security Conference", in other words a diplomatic thrust which could easily be calculated to further confuse the West, given the tendency toward absentmindedness in Western strategic discussion.

There were three areas in which the Soviet drive for influence in the West could be discerned. The first of these was in the various tactical maneuvers used to attempt a weakening of the linkage between the U.S. and the German problem. Initially, the Soviet Union attempted to inhibit the development of NATO by means of various disarmament proposals which the Soviets intended would serve to remove the U.S. from Europe militarily. NATO's response to this was to make clear the linkage between troop withdrawals and Soviet concessions on the German question. Secondly, in the area of Western integration policy, the fact that the political aim of equality among the allies could not be reconciled easily with the necessary inequality in the defense realm, particularly in regard to nuclear questions, meant that a potential existed which the Soviets could exploit, namely Western status sensitivities. Finally, the whole issue of the American presence had unintended side-effects. As an especially sensitive factor in relations between Europe and the United States, the Soviets were interested in ways of exploiting any possible fears which might arise over the question of American troop-stationing policy. It is likely, incidentally, that the Soviet willingness to discuss MBFR may be based in part on the hope of gaining a voice in this decision-making process.

Therefore it is possible to discern a peculiar irony in the Western position, an irony which is understandable only if one sees the forces of strategic disorientation at work. On their own merits, Western security policies were rational and credible. The three areas of possible Soviet influence just outlined were never intended by the West to be levers for Soviet policy, but rather as barriers to it. Nevertheless these three security components created certain political conditions which, although they theoretically went against Soviet interests, nevertheless gave Moscow the chance to gain influence over developments in the security policy area in the West. What emerged from this situation was that the political aims of the Soviets could begin to take shape. Moscow looked forward to:

- a) Increasing the difficulty of Western European integration.
- b) Helping reduce the American dominance in Western Europe.
- c) Gradually eliminating the German problem, i.e. preserving its own control over questions of Germany's future.

Moreover, through this a situation emerged in which the Soviet Union could begin a game of playing both sides off against each other. Moscow could cooperate with the United States at the expense of Western Europe, and it could cooperate with Western Europe at the expense of the United States. This is a game which is still going on in all aspects of European security affairs, from Ostpolitik to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.³⁴ Unfortunately, in the case of the latter, there are other factors which tend to complicate or blur the problem of Moscow's gamesmanship. The problem of Moscow's

psychological relationship to the position of strategic parity and/or superiority as this relates to arms build-ups, and problems of a technical nature (launchers, ABM vs. hard-site controversy) have either obscured the gamesmanship problem or have, at best, focused attention elsewhere temporarily.³⁵ In the SALT problem, the Soviets are able to engage the United States on issues which are of concern to the Americans, while casting doubt on the worthwhileness of the Europeans' wishes. For example the Soviet demand that forward bases' strike forces be reduced is in essence a wedge which they attempted to put in between the United States and the Federal Republic.

Strategy dealing with European security affairs must be cognizant, therefore, of the overall environment in which it is operating. It faces not a single threat, not a permanently fixed enemy poised to attack, but rather a process of slow and steady diplomatic pressure from the East. At the same time, the West's own room for manoeuvre, if one still can assume a certain amount of collective thinking on European security policy, is defined by some problems which are internal in nature.

To begin with, NATO is at the moment in an extremely delicate phase of its history, as an organization. A minimum of forces has already been reached in the West and the corresponding political structure has become extremely sensitive to the slightest shifts in troop strength. Unilateral reductions, or the hint of them from Washington, make the correlation of troops with political

agreement even more difficult. It is hardly thinkable, under these circumstances, that the use of military forces as an instrument of diplomatic bargaining can have much credence. This is especially true since, for the Soviet Union, the relationship between military potential and political structure, in contrast, is largely unproblematical. Not only is there military redundancy in the Warsaw Pact, but the comparatively simple alliance structure in the East means that there is probably less sensitivity in the area of correlation between military force and political structure.

Another point to be borne in mind in considering the West's possible room for maneuver is that NATO is attempting to prevent at least a further deterioration of the military balance. At the same time, it is necessary to pursue the goal, even if only a wish, of trying, on the basis of negotiated changes in the military situation in Europe to encourage changes in the political structure of Eastern Europe. This is a problem which is particularly acute in the case of the Federal Republic, since the outcome of a weakened military posture in West Germany would not necessarily be the development of a liberalized East German state. The political aims and the military and diplomatic strength of the West are in a state of ambiguity. In contrast, the Eastern Bloc appears to have practically solved its own military security problem and has its hands free to concentrate on the other than military components of European security affairs. Not only is it able to focus on the political aims of its policy, but by engaging the West in a negotiated reduction of potential and

existing forces may be aiming to achieve a decisive weakening of the military alliance system.

The "era of negotiations" into which the United States has entered therefore presents Washington with the following problem. At the same time that the United States intends to appear on the international stage as a recognized negotiator, the West's actual bargaining position is highly precarious. Not only is there a relatively low level of disposability of the Western military potential for the purpose of European security negotiations, but tendencies inside the West toward unilateral reduction undermine the West's position still further. The instrumentality of Eastern Bloc forces, on the other hand, is not a mirror-image of the Western situation. On the contrary, because of the rigidly systematized form of control in the Bloc, the Soviet Union is able to place its forces with relative ease. There is no indication that a reduction of the Soviet potential would in any way bring about a reduction in Soviet security and, instead, there is every chance that, in MBFR negotiations, the Soviets would be able to extract an extremely high price.

The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of strategic interaction could be pessimistic; a "decline of the West" state of mind needs little encouragement anyway. The question, however, is not whether one is to be optimistic or pessimistic, but rather how it has come about that Western power has been strategically disoriented. Several contributing factors to this disorientation

have been explored. The point has been made that strategy in the West confronts a counter-strategy, and that the threat to the West is in the area of old-fashioned power politics. The "struggle for mastery in Europe" has been continued, under Soviet prompting, into the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, European security is not a state to be achieved, or a problem to be solved, but is, and will continue to be, a process of protracted diplomatic interaction.

The first step toward attaining a proper sense of strategic orientation, is to be conscious of this understanding of European security policy. The second step, is to understand some of the ways in which NATO has led to the devolution of strategy.

FOOTNOTES

¹Michael Howard, "The Classical Strategists", Problems of Modern Strategy, ed. R. Aron et al. (London: Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp. 62-63. For a recent critical look at the American school of strategic thought, see Colin Gray, "What Rand Hath Wrought", Foreign Policy, No. 4 (Fall, 1971).

²Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 360.

³Ibid., p. 141.

⁴Ibid., p. 173.

⁵Alfons Dalma, "The Risks of a Detente Policy to Central Europe", Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 94.

⁶Clausewitz, quoted in Kissinger, op. cit., p. 343.

⁷Henry Kissinger in Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs (eds.) NATO in Quest of Cohesion (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 103.

⁸Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 427.

⁹Robert E. Osgood, "The Reappraisal of Limited War", R. Aron et. al. (ed.), op. cit., p. 109.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 119.

¹¹Michael Howard, op. cit., p. 75.

¹²Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 14.

¹³Two recent books which deal with the growth of Soviet military power are John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1971), and Thomas W. Wolfe,

Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). See also the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's supplementary statement submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense, The Shifting Balance of Military Power (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970). Reliable statistical analysis is contained in The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), and Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence a statement of Secretary Melvin R. Laird on the fiscal year 1972-76 defense program and the 1972 defense budget before the House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971.

¹⁴Marshall D. Shulman, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁵Ibid., Chapters 1 and 2.

¹⁶See "Materials on the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces", Vol. 1 (March 8, 1968) FB 48/68.09S and Vol. 2 (March 28, 1968) FB 62/68.15S published as a supplement to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report, Soviet Union.

¹⁷Uwe Nerlich, "Zur Struktur und Dynamik europäischer Sicherheitspolitik", Europa Archiv, Vol. 26, No. 14 (July 25, 1971), pp. 481-494.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 481.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 486. See also James L. Richardson's chapter on nuclear control, op. cit., pp. 199-223.

²⁰Richardson, op. cit., p. 213.

²¹For a discussion of current Western European developments in this field see Ian Smart, "Future Conditional, The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation", Adelphi Papers, No. 78 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), and Walter Schütze, "European Defence Co-operation in NATO", The Atlantic Papers, No. 3 (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1969).

²²Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, "Alternative Designs for the Atlantic Alliance", Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Summer, 1965), p. 359.

²³Nerlich, op. cit., p. 487.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony, "Strategic Asymmetries", Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 1 (Spring, 1965), pp. 40-41.

²⁶Nerlich, op. cit., p. 488.

²⁷V.D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 157.

²⁸Ibid., p. 159.

²⁹This is still a seductive idea. "Western strategic doctrines have had an 'educative' effect on Soviet political and military leaders". Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond", World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3 (April, 1971), p. 440.

³⁰S.L. Sharp, "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics", Problems of Communism, Vol. VII (March-April, 1958), pp. 15-21.

³¹Marshall D. Shulman, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

³²Nerlich, op. cit., p. 489.

³³For German discussion of the European Security Conference, see Christian Meier's documentation, "Die Probleme einer Europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz aus der Sicht der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages und des 'Zehnerausschusses'", Number 44 in the series Berichte des Bundesinstitutes für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, Cologne (July, 1970), and Gerhard Wettig, "Der sowjetische Kurs der europäischen Sicherheit - eine Entspannungspolitik neuen Typs", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament'), (August 1, 1970).

³⁴Chalmers Roberts, "The ABCs of FBS and SALT and MBFR and CES(ESC)", The Washington Post (May 29, 1971).

³⁵See Kolkowicz, op. cit., for a discussion of the perceptual problem. On the question of parity, see Walter Slocombe, "The Political Implications of Strategic Parity", Adelphi Papers, No. 77 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

CHAPTER VI

NATO AND ATLANTICISM: HABIT OR STRATEGY?

"In a sense the design for Atlantic community fails, not because it is ahead of its time, but because it reflects too much the shape of the past.

Laurence W. Martin

NATO has always been sufficiently opposed to the Soviets' hegemony over Eastern Europe to be the object of Soviet propaganda attacks, but it has never been sufficiently strong, strategically, to shift the political balance in Europe. In spite of its accumulated military capability, NATO has never been more than the sum total of its national components. It has remained an inter-governmental, not a supranational organization. There has never been, consequently, a NATO strategy, but rather an intergovernmental process whose movement, if seen from the outside, perhaps resembled strategy. NATO has been a complicated organization and a simple idea at the same time. The simplicity of NATO has been the link of the United States to European defense, the coupling of the American strategic potential to Europe. Since the idea that there should be such a linkage is valid, it has been easy to understand why the organization of that idea, NATO, should also be regarded as valid. Since there is no alternative to a unity between the United States and Europe, how could there be an alternative to NATO?

The identification of NATO with strategy, however, has tended to encourage the discussion of NATO's structural characteristics, not of strategy. The customary analysis of Euroatlantic politics contains either partisan observations about the disarray of NATO or its unmitigated success. Instead of future-oriented political thought focusing on the evolution of European security, attention has been fixed on the structure of Western institutions.

Strategy has been prone to disorientation not only because of the increase in the complexity of analysis mentioned earlier, but also as a reaction to the perception of the policy-making environment as intractable. The decision-maker's discomfiture is an integral part of the burden of leadership. What Brandt has called the "ordeal of coexistence" means that the real world of foreign policy involving European security is a tough and often unyielding one. The flavor of governance is sometimes unpleasant. It is no wonder that given the often strenuous conditions of survival imposed on the Federal Republic, some kind of long range vision is necessary to provide light at the end of the tunnel. But what kind of vision?

Political vision expresses itself in different qualities and in different directions which are disguised by like-sounding terminology. The basic confusion which surrounds the discussion of the "Atlantic Community" derives from two competing political notions which are qualitatively different and yet are apt to be understood as identical.

The first is the idea that Atlantic politics involves the

effective maintenance of a system of interdependent diplomacy and that the Atlantic whole is nothing more than the sum of the sovereign inputs of the member states at any given moment. As a process of diplomatic organization, it continues to exist as a system as long as each state participates consciously in it and as long as each state is able to carry out a function externally which serves the common interest of peacekeeping.

The second political notion is that the Atlantic community should be regarded as a whole for its own sake, as a higher and better international society which will emerge only when conflicts of national interest and policy differences are resolved in a transcendent, supranational synthesis. This notion is not just utopian; it is unrealistic. It assumes that conflict of interest is bad and that the way to achieve stability in the Euroatlantic region is to develop some kind of superstate - be it federal, confederal or imperial.

Both notions speak of an "Atlantic community" but they are dissimilar in thrust. Therefore a differentiation needs to be made between the idea of a collective diplomatic organization for its own sake, and an organization which deals with problems. The real problem of strategy is to revitalize the process of making initiatives rather than simply warding off Eastern probes and provocations. Policy making must be conscious of the kind of vision necessary for the purpose of this revitalization.

In recent years, a number of studies have been published to

serve as theoretical guidelines for Atlanticists. Probably the most up to date of these is the one published by the Institute for Strategic Studies under the direction of Alastair Buchan.¹ In this book, Europe's future is examined from a number of possible viewpoints and is broken down into such categories as "fragmented Europe", "Partnership Europe", "evolutionary Europe", and others. According to the ISS study, Europe will, if all goes well, be "mixed and functional"; a pragmatic approach to the problem of Europe's future is recommended over an approach which favors grand designs.

Buchan's book, and several others which have gone before it, have been illuminating for the policy makers who need images of the future.² But they have been silent when it comes to a discussion of the types of imagery which coexist in Euroatlantic politics. What is specifically lacking in Buchan's study is an explicit understanding of the difference between abstract and operational futures, from a strategic point of view. What Francis Bator has called "process vision", the ability to view the international system in flux and to grasp the essentially multi-dimensional and kaleidoscopic nature of policy problems is a kind of mental attitude which is not a recent innovation.³ It seems clear that it is necessary, for whatever reason, for each generation of policy makers to relearn this attitude. Unfortunately, the educational process is painfully slow in a world of rapid change.

The development of articulate process vision is probably the most pressing task for thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic

today. However, Buchan's study fails to articulate the difference between structure and process vision, and the German commentaries on the ISS study also miss the point. Buchan admits that his study does not offer solutions to the problem of Germany's future. This is then rectified in a Germany study which posits a "core Europe" (Kerneuropa); this study was one developed by a task force of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik.⁴ Once again, however, structuralism (regionalism) takes the place of process. At a time when Europe was supposed to exercise greater responsibility and insight, it would be counterproductive if Germany's political vision were to be expressed chiefly in terms of regionalism.⁵ The aim of strategic thought, as supported by its European pole, is not to develop structures but to guide national power in the search for peace and security.⁶ A less prescient and more provincial approach will not suffice. The idea of linking the Federal Republic to an Atlantic Community as a means of providing external security was simple, and the fact of its comprehensibility contributed, in turn, to a sense of security. But the great danger of positing a theory of Germany's being anchored in the Atlantic Community is that it has denoted, for the Germans particularly, a dogmatic picture of a unified whole, the Atlantic Community, which never existed and probably never will. Rather, the idea of the Atlantic Community as it emerged at the beginning of the postwar period was an attempt to capture the prevailing tendencies of a) a close cooperative relationship with Europe and b) the desire in many capitals for a consolidation of Western

forces in the aftermath of Europe's most irrational and destructive period. The confusion of these original motives for setting up NATO with the belief in the superiority of supranational diplomacy is still at the heart of the reaction to what only appears as disarray. This is really a mistaken concentration on precisely that notion of an Atlantic alliance which has been a chimera all along, namely a supranational diplomatic organization.

What is sorely misunderstood is that the genesis of the Atlantic Alliance was not an immaculate conception but rather the incremental development of disparate initiatives made by like-minded men. They were like-minded in the sense that they were exponents of similar process vision.

Process vision, then, is the ability to view Eurolantic developments synthetically, in preparation for establishing a higher degree of congruence in the organization of international security affairs. If there is any similarity in outlook today in Western capitals, it cannot simply be the ritual of pledging allegiance to Atlanticism. German participation in collective defense, and American participation, cannot best be thought of as a sacrifice of sovereignty to some distant alliance system, an act which becomes an interminable ordeal, an incomprehensible habit. Rather, the United States and Germany allocate resources to a process of congruent diplomacies: it is this act of allocation which is the basis of collective defense and the core of any alliance. Therefore the proper question is not whether or not to be in NATO, but whether NATO fulfills the current

needs of international security policy and is a realistic and comprehensible way to allocate national resources as seen in terms of process vision. To the extent that the orientation of this allocation of national power is misdirected either toward the creation of a utopia, or toward a paralyzing entanglement, it will be self-defeating. NATO, it must be remembered is not a supranational organization dedicated to the eradication of conflicts of interest among nation states. Rather, to the extent that it remains an effective instrument, it reflects the will of various decision-making bodies in different national capitals to conduct mutually advantageous diplomacies and to devise flexible strategies which maintain peace.

Much of the discussion of European futures has been in terms of a supercession of diplomatic diversity and sovereign inputs in transcendent schemes of integration, federation and community. Common to this discussion is the belief that supranational organizations or superstates can somehow provide relief from the errors and burdens of sovereign diplomacy. "It may be that the world will eventually find salvation in federation, but to assume that this is inevitable is to close our minds to more imaginative and more functional means of making progress from our present difficulties".⁷ It is a major mistake to think that the task of organizing peace can be passed on to supranational organizations in the belief that they are wiser (as immutable organizations) than the men who founded them and stronger than the nations which support them. The phenomenon

whereby an instrument of diplomacy is turned into a self-perpetuating organization is perhaps one of the most persistent examples of strategic wishful thinking, absentmindedness and impotence in our time; it is inseparable from the problem of the misuse of power, since power is a buck which can be passed quite easily.

The transmutation of the German question, either through diplomatic entanglement or through misdirected vision need not be a permanent feature of international politics. But to break out of the current deadlock, international security policy involving Germany must focus on the evolution of the European security problem as a process of nation-state relations. There must be a deliberate attempt to overcome transcendent schemes and utopian politics. These accelerate the crisis of Western governance and lead directly to a condition of disorientation. Strategic alternative futures can then be geared toward going beyond the current achievements of Euroatlanticism which have, nevertheless, produced certain strains. If it is possible to reinterpret "alliance" to mean a system of congruent national functions, and if nations can deal with bilateral problems, it might be possible to move in the direction of a new stage of compatibility in Euroatlantic relations and new strength in policy toward the East.

The important thing is to realize that the Atlantic Idea has been both a positive and negative force in the governance and orientation of the Western powers. In its period of strength, Atlanticism provided a unifying framework for concerting disparate diplomacies. Strategically as a consolidating idea after the War, it focused the

attention of the participating nations on the problem of the Eastern bloc as the main obstacle to peace in Europe, and organized the defense of the West in a way which preserved a stable balance of forces in Europe.

The Atlantic idea has devolved from its period of strength into a political ideology which disorients the governments of the participating nations. There is less sense of an identity between national sovereignty and Atlanticism, and more feeling that Atlanticism is at cross purposes and in competition with what is felt to be an authentic exercise of power from the national base. Atlanticism has drifted into irrelevant supranationalism.⁸ Membership in NATO has become a habit and a chore, rather than a conscious, deliberate act of national sovereignty and strategy.

NATO as a habit makes it unnecessarily difficult for the United States to make selective policy toward Germany. NATO has obfuscated the politics of the German issue and has evolved into a convenient device to avoid grappling with urgent bilateral problems; the United States is able to postpone bilateral decisions by referring to the existence of NATO. The transfer of security policy and decision-making from the national base to an organization which is really only a mythical power, weakens the decision-making process of the American government and prevents the development of a deliberate exercise of German national sovereignty. Generally it impedes both the United States and Germany in their efforts to devise complementary policies in their desire to be mutually engaged on

a selective, rather than a ritual, habitual and frustrating basis. Given the larger East-West context of German-American relations in Europe, this could one day become a self-defeating security arrangement.

FOOTNOTES

¹Alastair Buchan, (ed.), op. cit. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969).

²For example, David Calleo, Europe's Future (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1967), and Harold van B. Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966).

³Francis M. Bator, "The Politics of Alliance: The United States and Western Europe", Agenda for the Nation, ed. Kermit Gordon (New York: Doubleday, 1968).

⁴"Alternativen für Europa", published as a special reprint by Europa Archiv, Vol. 23, 1969.

⁵For a cross section of current German writing which touches on the problem of alternative futures, readers might be interested in some of the following:

a) E.W. Baer-Kaupert, "Die Zukunft des europäisch-amerikanischen Verhältnisses", Europa Archiv, Vol. 25, No. 4 (February 25, 1970), pp. 129-136.

b) Kurt Birrenbach, "Politik und Modell", introduction to the German translation of the I.S.S. study, Europas Zukunft, Europas Alternativen (Opladen: Leske, 1969).

c) Willy Brandt, Friedenspolitik in Europa (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1968).

d) R. Jungk and H. Mundt, Deutschland ohne Konzeption? (München: Desch, 1964).

e) Theo Sommer, "Detente and Security: The Options", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1971), pp. 34-49.

f) W.W. Schütz, Modelle der Deutschlandpolitik (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966).

⁶The "two-pillar" theory is still in existence in Helmut Schmidt, Strategie des Gleichgewichts (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969).

⁷For an argument that integration theories are less effective than those which encourage action by a nation-state, see Nina Heathcote, "Western Integration and German Reunification 1966-1968", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 7 (December, 1968).

⁸Sometimes it has been steered in this direction. See Horst Mendershausen, "Transnational Society Vs. State Sovereignty", Rand Corporation Paper P-3806, March 1968, Santa Monica.

CONCLUSION

"This is not to deny that there is often much generosity of motive in the new diplomacy world view. But that viewpoint, Wilsonian, ideological, and impressed with military power, is heavily ethnocentric and thus misperceives much of the nature and framework of conflict among states. Its central weakness is an assumption that conflict is somehow "unnatural", and that to reconcile clashes of interest by the diplomatic method is less honorable than to discover the alleged "causes" of conflict and attack them root and branch either by military means or by direct appeals to peoples over the heads of their governments.

John F. Campbell

As they enter the 1970's, the United States and the Federal Republic are decreasingly able to conduct mutually advantageous diplomacy in the context of the NATO relationship. The need to develop a diplomatic relationship in keeping with their character as national units is unfulfilled because both continue to pledge ritual allegiance to a mythical Atlantic Community. Their alliance in NATO was made possible because, at the end of the Second World War, for different reasons, neither had a clear idea of its role as a nation-state. Both countries were willing to subscribe to a vision of international order which would "presumably transcend and subordinate separate national interests, represent indigenous harmony and initiative, and permit the U.S. to be one among several 'partners', even if it is the senior partner."¹

In the West, the postwar era was welcomed as an age which had

gone beyond the classical system of international relations, in which the nation-state exerts power and influence, respecting the limits of its authority.² Instead, the contemporary system of international relations was supposedly characterized by nation-state "interdependence", with the result that existing national bases were neglected as central orienting units in Western diplomacy. Irrespective of this ideology, however, bilateral problems have arisen which now call into question the entire conceptual framework of German-American relations. Until this is recognized, the idea that classical diplomacy is on the wane and that the nation-state is a remnant of the past will continue to act as a brake on Western power.

In the case of Germany, there are unique reasons for adhering to transcendent schemes, but regardless of the value of the vision of either a united Europe or a reunited Germany, the net effect of German security thinking has been to preserve a somewhat less than wholehearted and authentic relationship to the Federal Republic's existing power as a nation-state. Instead of embracing what national power exists, the Federal Republic's foreign policy has been conceived as a kind of preliminary rehearsal for future statecraft.

"German politicians are also continuously searching for allies and re-insurance brokers outside their own boundaries. This merely reflects the fact that in German politics the 'nation-state' has been surmounted, in practice as well as in theory, as the unit of political organization. The trouble is that a suitable framework has never sufficiently crystalized. For a long time the Adenauer ideologists sought to build up NATO as a substitute Heimat. Whereas in

other countries the initials stood for a remote military bureaucracy, in the Federal Republic they had an almost religious connotation. The alternative Heimat of 'Europe' has also had difficulties in finding a suitable institutionalized form as between federation or confederation, EDC, WEU, or EEC models. So it is quite understandable that even amidst great stability, German politicians are beset by underlying anxieties."³

The absence of the national dimension in the German political imagination is more a matter of political taboos than a question of political intelligence. "'The German Interest' is still a notion which produces fear and suspicion . . . I cannot, in all honesty, allay such fears and suspicions altogether. There might be a mature German foreign policy which would make full use of Germany's room for maneuver . . . would be oriented on goals which not only threaten nobody but would mean a more permanent and reliable settlement of European affairs than we have today."⁴

Why is it so difficult to imagine a "mature" German foreign policy? Quite simply, with nation-state diplomacy held in suspense there can be no mature foreign policy. Incredibly, it is this weakened national force which other Western countries, through NATO, have elevated as the political avant garde in detente diplomacy toward the Soviet bloc. The policy of "Germanizing" the German question, most recently exemplified by the Berlin Agreement, still runs the risk of prematurity. "The most pressing need is not the recognition of the 'German Democratic Republic' but rather the self-recognition of the Federal Republic as a state in the full sense of the term.

It can only restructure its relationship to the other regime rationally and peacefully from a position of strength".⁵

At a time when Germany has been given the task of carrying out arduous policy initiatives in the East, more insightful German attitudes about the Federal Republic indicate that the sense of national identity in Germany is still too inhibited to share America's strategic burdens. Reflective Germans observe ironically that Germany is still too dependent and lacks a policy based on national interest but that this situation is the only one possible.⁶ At present, therefore, Germany's role in NATO strategy has come into conflict with Germany's anxious national identity. This is a situation which will have to be looked at with great care in the future. For most Germans, relations with the United States and relations with NATO have become indistinguishable. Is there a danger that the relationship with the United States will also come into conflict with Germany's national identity?

FOOTNOTES

¹Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 2.

²For two expositions of this thesis see Gordon A. Craig, War, Politics and Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1966), and Quincy Wright, "The Decline of Classic Diplomacy", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (1963).

³Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Succession and Party Politics in West Germany", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (1964).

⁴Ralf Dahrendorf, "Bonn After Twenty Years: Are Germany's Problems Nearer Solution?" The World Today, Vol. 25, No. 4 (April, 1969), p. 168.

⁵Helmut Rumpf expressed this idea in Land ohne Souveränität (Karlsruhe: Muller, 1969).


⁶The writer is indebted to members of the staff of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik for this insight.

APPENDIX I

Diagram 1 - The Strategic Balance in 1970. White Paper 1970 on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Federal Armed Forces. Published by the Federal Minister of Defence on behalf of the German Federal Government.

Diagram 2 - Relative NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Capabilities. White Paper 1970 on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Federal Armed Forces. Published by the Federal Minister of Defence on behalf of the German Federal Government.

The Strategic Balance
in 1970*)




Land-based
intercontinental
ballistic missiles,
ranges from 8,000
to 12,000 km



Land-based
intermediate range
ballistic missiles,
ranges up to 4,000 km




Sea-based
missiles
(submarine-borne);
NATO: ranges from
2,220 to 4,600 km;
USSR: ranges from
480 to 2,400 km



Heavy bombers**)



Medium
bombers




*) No data on the strategic weapons of the People's Republic of China have, so far, become available.

***) The still existing 50 British V-bombers have been withdrawn from the nuclear role.

Operational U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Missiles

	1965 Mid-Year	1970 Projected for end of year
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles		
U.S.	934	1,054
Soviet	224	1,290
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles		
U.S.	464	656
Soviet	107	300

Relative NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Capabilities

Ground forces, Central Europe & Baltic area	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Number of Personnel 	703,000	855,000
Divisions 	26	57
Tanks 	6,600	13,650
Air forces, Europe		
Tactical combat aircraft 	F/B fighters 2,800 510 Total	4,480 3,400 7,880

APPENDIX II

Figure 1 - Eisenhower Strategy 1953-1960.


Figure 2 - Kennedy - Johnson Strategy 1961-1968.

Figure 3 - Foreign Policy Objective of Lasting Peace and Freedom
Through National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence and
a Foreign Policy Strategy of Vigorous Negotiation.

Figure 4 - Nixon Strategy for Peace: Strength - Partnership -
Negotiations


Source: Department of Defense. Defense Report on President
Nixon's Strategy for Peace. Toward A National Security Strategy
of Realistic Deterrence. Statement of Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program
and the 1972 Defense Budget. Before the House Armed Services
Committee, March 9, 1971.

FIGURE 1
EISENHOWER STRATEGY
1953 - 1960



* Deliveries, excluding Military Assistance, Service funded (Converted to constant dollars using same index as that for total DoD Budget).
** Includes three training divisions that did not have a combat assignment.

FIGURE 2
KENNEDY - JOHNSON STRATEGY
1961 - 1968



* Deliveries, excluding Military Assistance, Service funded (Converted to constant dollars using same index as that for Total DoD Budget).

FIGURE 3

**FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE OF LASTING PEACE AND FREEDOM
THROUGH
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE
AND
A FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF VIGOROUS NEGOTIATION**





FIGURE 4
NIXON STRATEGY FOR PEACE
STRENGTH - PARTNERSHIP - NEGOTIATIONS



* FY 1972 Baseline Forces
** FY 1972 Program

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